| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Win32K - GRFX allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| open62541 1.5.0 before 1.5.7 contains an integer overflow in UA_DataType_fromStructureDescription() that wraps the 16-bit memSize field for large custom structure definitions. A malicious OPC UA server can supply DataType definitions via UA_Client_getRemoteDataTypes(), causing decodeBinaryStructure() to overflow the heap, crashing clients or enabling code execution. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP. An integer overflow occurs in the file-pvr plug-in when calculating memory buffer sizes for image dimensions. By tricking a user into opening or previewing a specially crafted PowerVR (.pvr) file, an attacker can trigger a heap-based buffer overflow, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution or a Denial of Service (DoS) via an application crash. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: drop oversized fragments to avoid extra_len overflow
In ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(), fragment payloads are accumulated into
entry->extra_len as subsequent fragments arrive:
entry->extra_len += rx->skb->len;
When the final fragment arrives, the head fragment is dequeued, and
pskb_expand_head() is called with entry->extra_len to ensure sufficient
tailroom for all queued fragments before copying:
if (skb_tailroom(rx->skb) < entry->extra_len) {
if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(rx->skb, 0, entry->extra_len,
GFP_ATOMIC))) {
...
}
}
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&entry->skb_list))) {
skb_put_data(rx->skb, skb->data, skb->len);
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
}
In commit 69f132236827 ("mac80211: shrink struct
ieee80211_fragment_entry"), entry->extra_len was narrowed from unsigned
int to u16 in order to reduce structure memory footprint.
However, an IEEE 802.11 frame sequence can contain up to 16 fragments
(frag numbers 0..15). If a sequence of large fragments arrives (e.g. from
a malicious peer or rogue AP), the sum of fragment lengths can exceed
65535 bytes (for example, 15 fragments of 4400 bytes total 66000 bytes).
Because extra_len is a u16, this addition overflows and wraps around
modulo 65536 (e.g. 66000 wraps to 464).
Consequently, pskb_expand_head() allocates only the truncated amount of
tailroom (or is skipped entirely if the head fragment already has >= 464
bytes of tailroom). When skb_put_data() subsequently iterates through the
queued skb list, it appends the full payload into the undersized buffer,
causing skb_put() to trigger skb_over_panic() and crash the kernel in
softirq context.
A legitimate MSDU in IEEE 802.11 is at most 2304 bytes (or up to 7935/11454
bytes for A-MSDU, which is not fragmented), well below U16_MAX.
Fix this without increasing the size of struct ieee80211_fragment_entry by
checking whether adding the incoming fragment length would exceed U16_MAX.
If so, purge the queued fragments and drop the frame.
[assign a separate drop reason] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid5: let stripe batch bm_seq comparison wrap-safe
Once the 32-bit seq wraps, a newer bm_seq can look smaller
than old, so .. covert to wrap-safe calculate way. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Error Reporting allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows IP Over USB Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows iSCSI allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Remote Desktop Client allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| The SOAP HTTP client guards its response buffer growth with a check that relies on signed integer overflow, which is undefined behaviour and is not guaranteed to trigger. When the check is optimised away, a malicious SOAP server can make the client allocate a buffer far smaller than the data it then writes into it, producing a heap buffer overflow. |
| libsmb2 before 6.3 contains integer overflow vulnerabilities in the DCE/RPC NDR decoder in lib/dcerpc.c that allow heap out-of-bounds reads and writes. A malicious SMB server or machine-in-the-middle on unsigned connections can send crafted NetrShareEnum replies with wrapping actual_count or max_count values when clients call smb2_share_enum_async(), corrupting heap memory. |
| pupnp is an SDK for development of UPnP device and control point applications. Prior to 2.0.2, raw_to_int in upnp/src/genlib/net/http/httpparser.c parses Content-Length with strtol and casts the resulting long to a 32-bit int before the caller stores it as unsigned int. On LP64 systems, values greater than INT_MAX can truncate or wrap, so the HTTP parser can accept a body length different from the declared value. A remote adjacent-network peer can use the resulting parser disagreement to leave bytes to be interpreted as another request in persistent or proxied contexts, or can make a worker wait for an extremely large body and cause denial of service. This issue is fixed in 2.0.2. |
| phar_tar_number() parses the octal size field of a TAR header into a uint32_t with no overflow check. The field is 11 octal digits wide and holds values up to 0x1FFFFFFFF, so a size above 0xFFFFFFFF silently wraps. The parser then skips the wrong number of data blocks and interprets attacker-controlled file content as the next TAR header, which lets a crafted archive inject entries that PharData reports and extracts as if they were genuine. |
| A flaw was found in spice-server. The GLZ encoder dictionary restore path truncates a size_t allocation size to int when calling the malloc callback, allowing a malicious authenticated SPICE client during VM live migration to trigger a massive heap buffer overflow by sending a crafted max_encoders value in migration data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/gic-v3-its: Avoid truncating memory addresses
On 32-bit machines with CONFIG_ARM_LPAE, it is possible for lowmem
allocations to be backed by addresses physical memory above the 32-bit
address limit, as found while experimenting with larger VMSPLIT
configurations.
This caused the qemu virt model to crash in the GICv3 driver, which
allocates the 'itt' object using GFP_KERNEL. Since all memory below
the 4GB physical address limit is in ZONE_DMA in this configuration,
kmalloc() defaults to higher addresses for ZONE_NORMAL, and the
ITS driver stores the physical address in a 32-bit 'unsigned long'
variable.
Change the itt_addr variable to the correct phys_addr_t type instead,
along with all other variables in this driver that hold a physical
address.
The gicv5 driver correctly uses u64 variables, while all other irqchip
drivers don't call virt_to_phys or similar interfaces. It's expected that
other device drivers have similar issues, but fixing this one is
sufficient for booting a virtio based guest. |
| A 32-bit integer wraparound in the MongoDB C Driver's Windows-only Kerberos/SSPI authentication code can cause an undersized heap buffer to be allocated when an excessively long credential value is supplied in the client's connection configuration. A party able to control that client-side configuration, in conjunction with the affected authentication mechanism, can cause the driver to write outside the bounds of the allocated buffer. This may result in corruption of client process memory and denial of service of the client application. The issue affects only client builds compiled with the Windows-native authentication backend. |
| Integer overflow in OpenModSim (<=1.11.0), leading to denial of service |
