| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/deadline: Fix missing ENQUEUE_REPLENISH during PI de-boosting
Running stress-ng --schedpolicy 0 on an RT kernel on a big machine
might lead to the following WARNINGs (edited).
sched: DL de-boosted task PID 22725: REPLENISH flag missing
WARNING: CPU: 93 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/deadline.c:239 dequeue_task_dl+0x15c/0x1f8
... (running_bw underflow)
Call trace:
dequeue_task_dl+0x15c/0x1f8 (P)
dequeue_task+0x80/0x168
deactivate_task+0x24/0x50
push_dl_task+0x264/0x2e0
dl_task_timer+0x1b0/0x228
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x188/0x378
hrtimer_interrupt+0xfc/0x260
...
The problem is that when a SCHED_DEADLINE task (lock holder) is
changed to a lower priority class via sched_setscheduler(), it may
fail to properly inherit the parameters of potential DEADLINE donors
if it didn't already inherit them in the past (shorter deadline than
donor's at that time). This might lead to bandwidth accounting
corruption, as enqueue_task_dl() won't recognize the lock holder as
boosted.
The scenario occurs when:
1. A DEADLINE task (donor) blocks on a PI mutex held by another
DEADLINE task (holder), but the holder doesn't inherit parameters
(e.g., it already has a shorter deadline)
2. sched_setscheduler() changes the holder from DEADLINE to a lower
class while still holding the mutex
3. The holder should now inherit DEADLINE parameters from the donor
and be enqueued with ENQUEUE_REPLENISH, but this doesn't happen
Fix the issue by introducing __setscheduler_dl_pi(), which detects when
a DEADLINE (proper or boosted) task gets setscheduled to a lower
priority class. In case, the function makes the task inherit DEADLINE
parameters of the donoer (pi_se) and sets ENQUEUE_REPLENISH flag to
ensure proper bandwidth accounting during the next enqueue operation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rw: free potentially allocated iovec on cache put failure
If a read/write request goes through io_req_rw_cleanup() and has an
allocated iovec attached and fails to put to the rw_cache, then it may
end up with an unaccounted iovec pointer. Have io_rw_recycle() return
whether it recycled the request or not, and use that to gauge whether to
free a potential iovec or not. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: secure_seq: add back ports to TS offset
This reverts 28ee1b746f49 ("secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets")
tcp_tw_recycle went away in 2017.
Zhouyan Deng reported off-path TCP source port leakage via
SYN cookie side-channel that can be fixed in multiple ways.
One of them is to bring back TCP ports in TS offset randomization.
As a bonus, we perform a single siphash() computation
to provide both an ISN and a TS offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: reject new transactions if the fs is fully read-only
[BUG]
There is a bug report where a heavily fuzzed fs is mounted with all
rescue mount options, which leads to the following warnings during
unmount:
BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -22)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9758 Comm: repro.out Not tainted
6.19.0-rc5-00002-gb71e635feefc #7 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4208 [inline]
RIP: 0010:find_free_extent+0x52f0/0x5d20 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4611
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_reserve_extent+0x2cd/0x790 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4705
btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1e1/0x10e0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5157
btrfs_force_cow_block+0x578/0x2410 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:517
btrfs_cow_block+0x3c4/0xa80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:708
btrfs_search_slot+0xcad/0x2b50 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2130
btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0x45d/0x2350 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:499
btrfs_evict_inode+0x923/0xe70 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5628
evict+0x5f4/0xae0 fs/inode.c:837
__dentry_kill+0x209/0x660 fs/dcache.c:670
finish_dput+0xc9/0x480 fs/dcache.c:879
shrink_dcache_for_umount+0xa0/0x170 fs/dcache.c:1661
generic_shutdown_super+0x67/0x2c0 fs/super.c:621
kill_anon_super+0x3b/0x70 fs/super.c:1289
btrfs_kill_super+0x41/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2127
deactivate_locked_super+0xbc/0x130 fs/super.c:474
cleanup_mnt+0x425/0x4c0 fs/namespace.c:1318
task_work_run+0x1d4/0x260 kernel/task_work.c:233
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]
do_exit+0x694/0x22f0 kernel/exit.c:971
do_group_exit+0x21c/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1112
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1123 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1121 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1121
x64_sys_call+0x2210/0x2210 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe8/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x44f639
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x44f60f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffc15c4e088 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004c32f0 RCX: 000000000044f639
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004c32f0
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
Since rescue mount options will mark the full fs read-only, there should
be no new transaction triggered.
But during unmount we will evict all inodes, which can trigger a new
transaction, and triggers warnings on a heavily corrupted fs.
[CAUSE]
Btrfs allows new transaction even on a read-only fs, this is to allow
log replay happen even on read-only mounts, just like what ext4/xfs do.
However with rescue mount options, the fs is fully read-only and cannot
be remounted read-write, thus in that case we should also reject any new
transactions.
[FIX]
If we find the fs has rescue mount options, we should treat the fs as
error, so that no new transaction can be started. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Disable MMIO access during SMU Mode 1 reset
During Mode 1 reset, the ASIC undergoes a reset cycle and becomes
temporarily inaccessible via PCIe. Any attempt to access MMIO registers
during this window (e.g., from interrupt handlers or other driver threads)
can result in uncompleted PCIe transactions, leading to NMI panics or
system hangs.
To prevent this, set the `no_hw_access` flag to true immediately after
triggering the reset. This signals other driver components to skip
register accesses while the device is offline.
A memory barrier `smp_mb()` is added to ensure the flag update is
globally visible to all cores before the driver enters the sleep/wait
state.
(cherry picked from commit 7edb503fe4b6d67f47d8bb0dfafb8e699bb0f8a4) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: Fix misalignment bug in struct virtnet_info
Use the new TRAILING_OVERLAP() helper to fix a misalignment bug
along with the following warning:
drivers/net/virtio_net.c:429:46: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
This helper creates a union between a flexible-array member (FAM)
and a set of members that would otherwise follow it (in this case
`u8 rss_hash_key_data[VIRTIO_NET_RSS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];`). This
overlays the trailing members (rss_hash_key_data) onto the FAM
(hash_key_data) while keeping the FAM and the start of MEMBERS aligned.
The static_assert() ensures this alignment remains.
Notice that due to tail padding in flexible `struct
virtio_net_rss_config_trailer`, `rss_trailer.hash_key_data`
(at offset 83 in struct virtnet_info) and `rss_hash_key_data` (at
offset 84 in struct virtnet_info) are misaligned by one byte. See
below:
struct virtio_net_rss_config_trailer {
__le16 max_tx_vq; /* 0 2 */
__u8 hash_key_length; /* 2 1 */
__u8 hash_key_data[]; /* 3 0 */
/* size: 4, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */
/* padding: 1 */
/* last cacheline: 4 bytes */
};
struct virtnet_info {
...
struct virtio_net_rss_config_trailer rss_trailer; /* 80 4 */
/* XXX last struct has 1 byte of padding */
u8 rss_hash_key_data[40]; /* 84 40 */
...
/* size: 832, cachelines: 13, members: 48 */
/* sum members: 801, holes: 8, sum holes: 31 */
/* paddings: 2, sum paddings: 5 */
};
After changes, those members are correctly aligned at offset 795:
struct virtnet_info {
...
union {
struct virtio_net_rss_config_trailer rss_trailer; /* 792 4 */
struct {
unsigned char __offset_to_hash_key_data[3]; /* 792 3 */
u8 rss_hash_key_data[40]; /* 795 40 */
}; /* 792 43 */
}; /* 792 44 */
...
/* size: 840, cachelines: 14, members: 47 */
/* sum members: 801, holes: 8, sum holes: 35 */
/* padding: 4 */
/* paddings: 1, sum paddings: 4 */
/* last cacheline: 8 bytes */
};
As a result, the RSS key passed to the device is shifted by 1
byte: the last byte is cut off, and instead a (possibly
uninitialized) byte is added at the beginning.
As a last note `struct virtio_net_rss_config_hdr *rss_hdr;` is also
moved to the end, since it seems those three members should stick
around together. :) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark bpf_refcount field as unique
BPF_REFCOUNT is not marked as a unique field, while it should be. Fix
this oversight. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: don't WARN for connections on invalid channels
It's not clear (to me) how exactly syzbot managed to hit this,
but it seems conceivable that e.g. regulatory changed and has
disabled a channel between scanning (channel is checked to be
usable by cfg80211_get_ies_channel_number) and connecting on
the channel later.
With one scenario that isn't covered elsewhere described above,
the warning isn't good, replace it with a (more informative)
error message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/tilcdc: Fix removal actions in case of failed probe
The drm_kms_helper_poll_fini() and drm_atomic_helper_shutdown() helpers
should only be called when the device has been successfully registered.
Currently, these functions are called unconditionally in tilcdc_fini(),
which causes warnings during probe deferral scenarios.
[ 7.972317] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 23 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_state_helper.c:175 drm_atomic_helper_crtc_duplicate_state+0x60/0x68
...
[ 8.005820] drm_atomic_helper_crtc_duplicate_state from drm_atomic_get_crtc_state+0x68/0x108
[ 8.005858] drm_atomic_get_crtc_state from drm_atomic_helper_disable_all+0x90/0x1c8
[ 8.005885] drm_atomic_helper_disable_all from drm_atomic_helper_shutdown+0x90/0x144
[ 8.005911] drm_atomic_helper_shutdown from tilcdc_fini+0x68/0xf8 [tilcdc]
[ 8.005957] tilcdc_fini [tilcdc] from tilcdc_pdev_probe+0xb0/0x6d4 [tilcdc]
Fix this by rewriting the failed probe cleanup path using the standard
goto error handling pattern, which ensures that cleanup functions are
only called on successfully initialized resources. Additionally, remove
the now-unnecessary is_registered flag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
shmem: fix recovery on rename failures
maple_tree insertions can fail if we are seriously short on memory;
simple_offset_rename() does not recover well if it runs into that.
The same goes for simple_offset_rename_exchange().
Moreover, shmem_whiteout() expects that if it succeeds, the caller will
progress to d_move(), i.e. that shmem_rename2() won't fail past the
successful call of shmem_whiteout().
Not hard to fix, fortunately - mtree_store() can't fail if the index we
are trying to store into is already present in the tree as a singleton.
For simple_offset_rename_exchange() that's enough - we just need to be
careful about the order of operations.
For simple_offset_rename() solution is to preinsert the target into the
tree for new_dir; the rest can be done without any potentially failing
operations.
That preinsertion has to be done in shmem_rename2() rather than in
simple_offset_rename() itself - otherwise we'd need to deal with the
possibility of failure after successful shmem_whiteout(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid10: wait barrier before returning discard request with REQ_NOWAIT
raid10_handle_discard should wait barrier before returning a discard bio
which has REQ_NOWAIT. And there is no need to print warning calltrace
if a discard bio has REQ_NOWAIT flag. Quality engineer usually checks
dmesg and reports error if dmesg has warning/error calltrace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/s390: Make attach succeed when the device was surprise removed
When a PCI device is removed with surprise hotplug, there may still be
attempts to attach the device to the default domain as part of tear down
via (__iommu_release_dma_ownership()), or because the removal happens
during probe (__iommu_probe_device()). In both cases zpci_register_ioat()
fails with a cc value indicating that the device handle is invalid. This
is because the device is no longer part of the instance as far as the
hypervisor is concerned.
Currently this leads to an error return and s390_iommu_attach_device()
fails. This triggers the WARN_ON() in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail()
because attaching to the default domain must never fail.
With the device fenced by the hypervisor no DMAs to or from memory are
possible and the IOMMU translations have no effect. Proceed as if the
registration was successful and let the hotplug event handling clean up
the device.
This is similar to how devices in the error state are handled since
commit 59bbf596791b ("iommu/s390: Make attach succeed even if the device
is in error state") except that for removal the domain will not be
registered later. This approach was also previously discussed at the
link.
Handle both cases, error state and removal, in a helper which checks if
the error needs to be propagated or ignored. Avoid magic number
condition codes by using the pre-existing, but never used, defines for
PCI load/store condition codes and rename them to reflect that they
apply to all PCI instructions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: let recv_done verify data_offset, data_length and remaining_data_length
This is inspired by the related server fixes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: microchip-core-qspi: stop checking viability of op->max_freq in supports_op callback
In commit 13529647743d9 ("spi: microchip-core-qspi: Support per spi-mem
operation frequency switches") the logic for checking the viability of
op->max_freq in mchp_coreqspi_setup_clock() was copied into
mchp_coreqspi_supports_op(). Unfortunately, op->max_freq is not valid
when this function is called during probe but is instead zero.
Accordingly, baud_rate_val is calculated to be INT_MAX due to division
by zero, causing probe of the attached memory device to fail.
Seemingly spi-microchip-core-qspi was the only driver that had such a
modification made to its supports_op callback when the per_op_freq
capability was added, so just remove it to restore prior functionality. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
trace/fgraph: Fix the warning caused by missing unregister notifier
This warning was triggered during testing on v6.16:
notifier callback ftrace_suspend_notifier_call already registered
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 86 at kernel/notifier.c:23 notifier_chain_register+0x44/0xb0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x34/0x60
register_ftrace_graph+0x330/0x410
ftrace_profile_write+0x1e9/0x340
vfs_write+0xf8/0x420
? filp_flush+0x8a/0xa0
? filp_close+0x1f/0x30
? do_dup2+0xaf/0x160
ksys_write+0x65/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
When writing to the function_profile_enabled interface, the notifier was
not unregistered after start_graph_tracing failed, causing a warning the
next time function_profile_enabled was written.
Fixed by adding unregister_pm_notifier in the exception path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: x86/aegis - Add missing error checks
The skcipher_walk functions can allocate memory and can fail, so
checking for errors is necessary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mremap: fix WARN with uffd that has remap events disabled
Registering userfaultd on a VMA that spans at least one PMD and then
mremap()'ing that VMA can trigger a WARN when recovering from a failed
page table move due to a page table allocation error.
The code ends up doing the right thing (recurse, avoiding moving actual
page tables), but triggering that WARN is unpleasant:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 6133 at mm/mremap.c:357 move_normal_pmd mm/mremap.c:357 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 6133 at mm/mremap.c:357 move_pgt_entry mm/mremap.c:595 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 6133 at mm/mremap.c:357 move_page_tables+0x3832/0x44a0 mm/mremap.c:852
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6133 Comm: syz.0.19 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00004-g53e760d89498 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:move_normal_pmd mm/mremap.c:357 [inline]
RIP: 0010:move_pgt_entry mm/mremap.c:595 [inline]
RIP: 0010:move_page_tables+0x3832/0x44a0 mm/mremap.c:852
Code: ...
RSP: 0018:ffffc900037a76d8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000032930007 RCX: ffffffff820c6645
RDX: ffff88802e56a440 RSI: ffffffff820c7201 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: ffff888037728fc0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000032930007 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc900037a79a8 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 000055556316a500(0000) GS:ffff8880d68bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b30863fff CR3: 0000000050171000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
copy_vma_and_data+0x468/0x790 mm/mremap.c:1215
move_vma+0x548/0x1780 mm/mremap.c:1282
mremap_to+0x1b7/0x450 mm/mremap.c:1406
do_mremap+0xfad/0x1f80 mm/mremap.c:1921
__do_sys_mremap+0x119/0x170 mm/mremap.c:1977
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x4c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f00d0b8ebe9
Code: ...
RSP: 002b:00007ffe5ea5ee98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000019
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f00d0db5fa0 RCX: 00007f00d0b8ebe9
RDX: 0000000000400000 RSI: 0000000000c00000 RDI: 0000200000000000
RBP: 00007ffe5ea5eef0 R08: 0000200000c00000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: 00007f00d0db5fa0 R14: 00007f00d0db5fa0 R15: 0000000000000005
</TASK>
The underlying issue is that we recurse during the original page table
move, but not during the recovery move.
Fix it by checking for both VMAs and performing the check before the
pmd_none() sanity check.
Add a new helper where we perform+document that check for the PMD and PUD
level.
Thanks to Harry for bisecting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix sleeping-in-atomic in ath11k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask()
ath11k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate() is passed as the iterator to
ieee80211_iterate_stations_atomic(). Note in this case the iterator is
required to be atomic, however ath11k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate() does
not follow it as it might sleep. Consequently below warning is seen:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at wmi.c:304
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl
__might_resched.cold
ath11k_wmi_cmd_send
ath11k_wmi_set_peer_param
ath11k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate
ieee80211_iterate_stations_atomic
ath11k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask.cold
Change to ieee80211_iterate_stations_mtx() to fix this issue.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Fix backlog accounting in qdisc_dequeue_internal
This issue applies for the following qdiscs: hhf, fq, fq_codel, and
fq_pie, and occurs in their change handlers when adjusting to the new
limit. The problem is the following in the values passed to the
subsequent qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog call given a tbf parent:
When the tbf parent runs out of tokens, skbs of these qdiscs will
be placed in gso_skb. Their peek handlers are qdisc_peek_dequeued,
which accounts for both qlen and backlog. However, in the case of
qdisc_dequeue_internal, ONLY qlen is accounted for when pulling
from gso_skb. This means that these qdiscs are missing a
qdisc_qstats_backlog_dec when dropping packets to satisfy the
new limit in their change handlers.
One can observe this issue with the following (with tc patched to
support a limit of 0):
export TARGET=fq
tc qdisc del dev lo root
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: tbf rate 8bit burst 100b latency 1ms
tc qdisc replace dev lo handle 3: parent 1:1 $TARGET limit 1000
echo ''; echo 'add child'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
ping -I lo -f -c2 -s32 -W0.001 127.0.0.1 2>&1 >/dev/null
echo ''; echo 'after ping'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
tc qdisc change dev lo handle 3: parent 1:1 $TARGET limit 0
echo ''; echo 'after limit drop'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
tc qdisc replace dev lo handle 2: parent 1:1 sfq
echo ''; echo 'post graft'; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo
The second to last show command shows 0 packets but a positive
number (74) of backlog bytes. The problem becomes clearer in the
last show command, where qdisc_purge_queue triggers
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog with the positive backlog and causes an
underflow in the tbf parent's backlog (4096 Mb instead of 0).
To fix this issue, the codepath for all clients of qdisc_dequeue_internal
has been simplified: codel, pie, hhf, fq, fq_pie, and fq_codel.
qdisc_dequeue_internal handles the backlog adjustments for all cases that
do not directly use the dequeue handler.
The old fq_codel_change limit adjustment loop accumulated the arguments to
the subsequent qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog call through the cstats field.
However, this is confusing and error prone as fq_codel_dequeue could also
potentially mutate this field (which qdisc_dequeue_internal calls in the
non gso_skb case), so we have unified the code here with other qdiscs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: nintendo: avoid bluetooth suspend/resume stalls
Ensure we don't stall or panic the kernel when using bluetooth-connected
controllers. This was reported as an issue on android devices using
kernel 6.6 due to the resume hook which had been added for usb joycons.
First, set a new state value to JOYCON_CTLR_STATE_SUSPENDED in a
newly-added nintendo_hid_suspend. This makes sure we will not stall out
the kernel waiting for input reports during led classdev suspend. The
stalls could happen if connectivity is unreliable or lost to the
controller prior to suspend.
Second, since we lose connectivity during suspend, do not try
joycon_init() for bluetooth controllers in the nintendo_hid_resume path.
Tested via multiple suspend/resume flows when using the controller both
in USB and bluetooth modes. |
