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Search Results (26234 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-68238 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: cadence: fix DMA device NULL pointer dereference The DMA device pointer `dma_dev` was being dereferenced before ensuring that `cdns_ctrl->dmac` is properly initialized. Move the assignment of `dma_dev` after successfully acquiring the DMA channel to ensure the pointer is valid before use. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68240 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: avoid having an active sc_timer before freeing sci Because kthread_stop did not stop sc_task properly and returned -EINTR, the sc_timer was not properly closed, ultimately causing the problem [1] reported by syzbot when freeing sci due to the sc_timer not being closed. Because the thread sc_task main function nilfs_segctor_thread() returns 0 when it succeeds, when the return value of kthread_stop() is not 0 in nilfs_segctor_destroy(), we believe that it has not properly closed sc_timer. We use timer_shutdown_sync() to sync wait for sc_timer to shutdown, and set the value of sc_task to NULL under the protection of lock sc_state_lock, so as to avoid the issue caused by sc_timer not being properly shutdowned. [1] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: 00000000dacb411a object type: timer_list hint: nilfs_construction_timeout Call trace: nilfs_segctor_destroy fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2811 [inline] nilfs_detach_log_writer+0x668/0x8cc fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2877 nilfs_put_super+0x4c/0x12c fs/nilfs2/super.c:509 | ||||
| CVE-2025-68242 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: Fix LTP test failures when timestamps are delegated The utimes01 and utime06 tests fail when delegated timestamps are enabled, specifically in subtests that modify the atime and mtime fields using the 'nobody' user ID. The problem can be reproduced as follow: # echo "/media *(rw,no_root_squash,sync)" >> /etc/exports # export -ra # mount -o rw,nfsvers=4.2 127.0.0.1:/media /tmpdir # cd /opt/ltp # ./runltp -d /tmpdir -s utimes01 # ./runltp -d /tmpdir -s utime06 This issue occurs because nfs_setattr does not verify the inode's UID against the caller's fsuid when delegated timestamps are permitted for the inode. This patch adds the UID check and if it does not match then the request is sent to the server for permission checking. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68244 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915: Avoid lock inversion when pinning to GGTT on CHV/BXT+VTD On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x16 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2025-68245 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: netpoll: fix incorrect refcount handling causing incorrect cleanup commit efa95b01da18 ("netpoll: fix use after free") incorrectly ignored the refcount and prematurely set dev->npinfo to NULL during netpoll cleanup, leading to improper behavior and memory leaks. Scenario causing lack of proper cleanup: 1) A netpoll is associated with a NIC (e.g., eth0) and netdev->npinfo is allocated, and refcnt = 1 - Keep in mind that npinfo is shared among all netpoll instances. In this case, there is just one. 2) Another netpoll is also associated with the same NIC and npinfo->refcnt += 1. - Now dev->npinfo->refcnt = 2; - There is just one npinfo associated to the netdev. 3) When the first netpolls goes to clean up: - The first cleanup succeeds and clears np->dev->npinfo, ignoring refcnt. - It basically calls `RCU_INIT_POINTER(np->dev->npinfo, NULL);` - Set dev->npinfo = NULL, without proper cleanup - No ->ndo_netpoll_cleanup() is either called 4) Now the second target tries to clean up - The second cleanup fails because np->dev->npinfo is already NULL. * In this case, ops->ndo_netpoll_cleanup() was never called, and the skb pool is not cleaned as well (for the second netpoll instance) - This leaks npinfo and skbpool skbs, which is clearly reported by kmemleak. Revert commit efa95b01da18 ("netpoll: fix use after free") and adds clarifying comments emphasizing that npinfo cleanup should only happen once the refcount reaches zero, ensuring stable and correct netpoll behavior. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68247 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-timers: Plug potential memory leak in do_timer_create() When posix timer creation is set to allocate a given timer ID and the access to the user space value faults, the function terminates without freeing the already allocated posix timer structure. Move the allocation after the user space access to cure that. [ tglx: Massaged change log ] | ||||
| CVE-2025-68248 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vmw_balloon: indicate success when effectively deflating during migration When migrating a balloon page, we first deflate the old page to then inflate the new page. However, if inflating the new page succeeded, we effectively deflated the old page, reducing the balloon size. In that case, the migration actually worked: similar to migrating+ immediately deflating the new page. The old page will be freed back to the buddy. Right now, the core will leave the page be marked as isolated (as we returned an error). When later trying to putback that page, we will run into the WARN_ON_ONCE() in balloon_page_putback(). That handling was changed in commit 3544c4faccb8 ("mm/balloon_compaction: stop using __ClearPageMovable()"); before that change, we would have tolerated that way of handling it. To fix it, let's just return 0 in that case, making the core effectively just clear the "isolated" flag + freeing it back to the buddy as if the migration succeeded. Note that the new page will also get freed when the core puts the last reference. Note that this also makes it all be more consistent: we will no longer unisolate the page in the balloon driver while keeping it marked as being isolated in migration core. This was found by code inspection. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68249 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: most: usb: hdm_probe: Fix calling put_device() before device initialization The early error path in hdm_probe() can jump to err_free_mdev before &mdev->dev has been initialized with device_initialize(). Calling put_device(&mdev->dev) there triggers a device core WARN and ends up invoking kref_put(&kobj->kref, kobject_release) on an uninitialized kobject. In this path the private struct was only kmalloc'ed and the intended release is effectively kfree(mdev) anyway, so free it directly instead of calling put_device() on an uninitialized device. This removes the WARNING and fixes the pre-initialization error path. | ||||
| CVE-2025-25273 | 2 Intel, Linux | 2 Ethernet 700 Series Software, Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.8 High |
| Insufficient control flow management in the Linux kernel-mode driver for some Intel(R) 700 Series Ethernet before version 2.28.5 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68257 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: check device's attached status in compat ioctls Syzbot identified an issue [1] that crashes kernel, seemingly due to unexistent callback dev->get_valid_routes(). By all means, this should not occur as said callback must always be set to get_zero_valid_routes() in __comedi_device_postconfig(). As the crash seems to appear exclusively in i386 kernels, at least, judging from [1] reports, the blame lies with compat versions of standard IOCTL handlers. Several of them are modified and do not use comedi_unlocked_ioctl(). While functionality of these ioctls essentially copy their original versions, they do not have required sanity check for device's attached status. This, in turn, leads to a possibility of calling select IOCTLs on a device that has not been properly setup, even via COMEDI_DEVCONFIG. Doing so on unconfigured devices means that several crucial steps are missed, for instance, specifying dev->get_valid_routes() callback. Fix this somewhat crudely by ensuring device's attached status before performing any ioctls, improving logic consistency between modern and compat functions. [1] Syzbot report: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 ... CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000006c717000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> get_valid_routes drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:1322 [inline] parse_insn+0x78c/0x1970 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:1401 do_insnlist_ioctl+0x272/0x700 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:1594 compat_insnlist drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:3208 [inline] comedi_compat_ioctl+0x810/0x990 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:3273 __do_compat_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:695 [inline] __se_compat_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:638 [inline] __ia32_compat_sys_ioctl+0x242/0x370 fs/ioctl.c:638 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:83 [inline] ... | ||||
| CVE-2025-68258 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: multiq3: sanitize config options in multiq3_attach() Syzbot identified an issue [1] in multiq3_attach() that induces a task timeout due to open() or COMEDI_DEVCONFIG ioctl operations, specifically, in the case of multiq3 driver. This problem arose when syzkaller managed to craft weird configuration options used to specify the number of channels in encoder subdevice. If a particularly great number is passed to s->n_chan in multiq3_attach() via it->options[2], then multiple calls to multiq3_encoder_reset() at the end of driver-specific attach() method will be running for minutes, thus blocking tasks and affected devices as well. While this issue is most likely not too dangerous for real-life devices, it still makes sense to sanitize configuration inputs. Enable a sensible limit on the number of encoder chips (4 chips max, each with 2 channels) to stop this behaviour from manifesting. [1] Syzbot crash: INFO: task syz.2.19:6067 blocked for more than 143 seconds. ... Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5254 [inline] __schedule+0x17c4/0x4d60 kernel/sched/core.c:6862 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6944 [inline] schedule+0x165/0x360 kernel/sched/core.c:6959 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x13/0x30 kernel/sched/core.c:7016 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:676 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x7e6/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:760 comedi_open+0xc0/0x590 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:2868 chrdev_open+0x4cc/0x5e0 fs/char_dev.c:414 do_dentry_open+0x953/0x13f0 fs/open.c:965 vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1097 ... | ||||
| CVE-2025-68310 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/pci: Avoid deadlock between PCI error recovery and mlx5 crdump Do not block PCI config accesses through pci_cfg_access_lock() when executing the s390 variant of PCI error recovery: Acquire just device_lock() instead of pci_dev_lock() as powerpc's EEH and generig PCI AER processing do. During error recovery testing a pair of tasks was reported to be hung: mlx5_core 0000:00:00.1: mlx5_health_try_recover:338:(pid 5553): health recovery flow aborted, PCI reads still not working INFO: task kmcheck:72 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kmcheck state:D stack:0 pid:72 tgid:72 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000 Call Trace: [<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590 [<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0 [<000000065256f572>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x22/0x30 [<0000000652570a94>] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x484/0x8a8 [<000003ff800673a4>] mlx5_unload_one+0x34/0x58 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff8006745c>] mlx5_pci_err_detected+0x94/0x140 [mlx5_core] [<0000000652556c5a>] zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery+0xf2/0x398 [<0000000651b9184a>] __zpci_event_error+0x23a/0x2c0 INFO: task kworker/u1664:6:1514 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u1664:6 state:D stack:0 pid:1514 tgid:1514 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000 Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:00:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core] Call Trace: [<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590 [<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0 [<0000000652172e28>] pci_wait_cfg+0x80/0xe8 [<0000000652172f94>] pci_cfg_access_lock+0x74/0x88 [<000003ff800916b6>] mlx5_vsc_gw_lock+0x36/0x178 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff80098824>] mlx5_crdump_collect+0x34/0x1c8 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff80074b62>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_dump+0x6a/0xe8 [mlx5_core] [<0000000652512242>] devlink_health_do_dump.part.0+0x82/0x168 [<0000000652513212>] devlink_health_report+0x19a/0x230 [<000003ff80075a12>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xba/0x1b0 [mlx5_core] No kernel log of the exact same error with an upstream kernel is available - but the very same deadlock situation can be constructed there, too: - task: kmcheck mlx5_unload_one() tries to acquire devlink lock while the PCI error recovery code has set pdev->block_cfg_access by way of pci_cfg_access_lock() - task: kworker mlx5_crdump_collect() tries to set block_cfg_access through pci_cfg_access_lock() while devlink_health_report() had acquired the devlink lock. A similar deadlock situation can be reproduced by requesting a crdump with > devlink health dump show pci/<BDF> reporter fw_fatal while PCI error recovery is executed on the same <BDF> physical function by mlx5_core's pci_error_handlers. On s390 this can be injected with > zpcictl --reset-fw <BDF> Tests with this patch failed to reproduce that second deadlock situation, the devlink command is rejected with "kernel answers: Permission denied" - and we get a kernel log message of: mlx5_core 1ed0:00:00.1: mlx5_crdump_collect:50:(pid 254382): crdump: failed to lock vsc gw err -5 because the config read of VSC_SEMAPHORE is rejected by the underlying hardware. Two prior attempts to address this issue have been discussed and ultimately rejected [see link], with the primary argument that s390's implementation of PCI error recovery is imposing restrictions that neither powerpc's EEH nor PCI AER handling need. Tests show that PCI error recovery on s390 is running to completion even without blocking access to PCI config space. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68281 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SDCA: bug fix while parsing mipi-sdca-control-cn-list "struct sdca_control" declares "values" field as integer array. But the memory allocated to it is of char array. This causes crash for sdca_parse_function API. This patch addresses the issue by allocating correct data size. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68282 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN: BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0 Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget->work at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget(). Commit 399a45e5237c ("usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after device removal") attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but before the gadget's memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free. This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a 'teardown' flag and a 'state_lock' spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced. The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68288 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: storage: Fix memory leak in USB bulk transport A kernel memory leak was identified by the 'ioctl_sg01' test from Linux Test Project (LTP). The following bytes were mainly observed: 0x53425355. When USB storage devices incorrectly skip the data phase with status data, the code extracts/validates the CSW from the sg buffer, but fails to clear it afterwards. This leaves status protocol data in srb's transfer buffer, such as the US_BULK_CS_SIGN 'USBS' signature observed here. Thus, this can lead to USB protocols leaks to user space through SCSI generic (/dev/sg*) interfaces, such as the one seen here when the LTP test requested 512 KiB. Fix the leak by zeroing the CSW data in srb's transfer buffer immediately after the validation of devices that skip data phase. Note: Differently from CVE-2018-1000204, which fixed a big leak by zero- ing pages at allocation time, this leak occurs after allocation, when USB protocol data is written to already-allocated sg pages. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68289 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_eem: Fix memory leak in eem_unwrap The existing code did not handle the failure case of usb_ep_queue in the command path, potentially leading to memory leaks. Improve error handling to free all allocated resources on usb_ep_queue failure. This patch continues to use goto logic for error handling, as the existing error handling is complex and not easily adaptable to auto-cleanup helpers. kmemleak results: unreferenced object 0xffffff895a512300 (size 240): backtrace: slab_post_alloc_hook+0xbc/0x3a4 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1b4/0x358 skb_clone+0x90/0xd8 eem_unwrap+0x1cc/0x36c unreferenced object 0xffffff8a157f4000 (size 256): backtrace: slab_post_alloc_hook+0xbc/0x3a4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b4/0x2dc kmalloc_trace+0x48/0x140 dwc3_gadget_ep_alloc_request+0x58/0x11c usb_ep_alloc_request+0x40/0xe4 eem_unwrap+0x204/0x36c unreferenced object 0xffffff8aadbaac00 (size 128): backtrace: slab_post_alloc_hook+0xbc/0x3a4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b4/0x2dc __kmalloc+0x64/0x1a8 eem_unwrap+0x218/0x36c unreferenced object 0xffffff89ccef3500 (size 64): backtrace: slab_post_alloc_hook+0xbc/0x3a4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b4/0x2dc kmalloc_trace+0x48/0x140 eem_unwrap+0x238/0x36c | ||||
| CVE-2025-68297 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix crash in process_v2_sparse_read() for encrypted directories The crash in process_v2_sparse_read() for fscrypt-encrypted directories has been reported. Issue takes place for Ceph msgr2 protocol in secure mode. It can be reproduced by the steps: sudo mount -t ceph :/ /mnt/cephfs/ -o name=admin,fs=cephfs,ms_mode=secure (1) mkdir /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3 (2) cp area_decrypted.tar /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3 (3) fscrypt encrypt --source=raw_key --key=./my.key /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3 (4) fscrypt lock /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3 (5) fscrypt unlock --key=my.key /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3 (6) cat /mnt/cephfs/fscrypt-test-3/area_decrypted.tar (7) Issue has been triggered [ 408.072247] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 408.072251] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 392 at net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:865 ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x4b39/0x72f0 [ 408.072267] Modules linked in: intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common intel_pmc_core pmt_telemetry pmt_discovery pmt_class intel_pmc_ssram_telemetry intel_vsec kvm_intel joydev kvm irqbypass polyval_clmulni ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel rapl input_leds psmouse serio_raw i2c_piix4 vga16fb bochs vgastate i2c_smbus floppy mac_hid qemu_fw_cfg pata_acpi sch_fq_codel rbd msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore [ 408.072304] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 392 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc7+ [ 408.072307] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-5.fc42 04/01/2014 [ 408.072310] Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [ 408.072314] RIP: 0010:ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x4b39/0x72f0 [ 408.072317] Code: c7 c1 20 f0 d4 ae 50 31 d2 48 c7 c6 60 27 d5 ae 48 c7 c7 f8 8e 6f b0 68 60 38 d5 ae e8 00 47 61 fe 48 83 c4 18 e9 ac fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 06 fe ff ff 4c 8b 9d 98 fd ff ff 0f 84 64 e7 ff ff 89 85 [ 408.072319] RSP: 0018:ffff88811c3e7a30 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 408.072322] RAX: ffffed1024874c6f RBX: ffffea00042c2b40 RCX: 0000000000000f38 [ 408.072324] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 408.072325] RBP: ffff88811c3e7ca8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000000000c8 [ 408.072326] R10: 00000000000000c8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000000c8 [ 408.072327] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8881243a6030 R15: 0000000000003000 [ 408.072329] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88823eadf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 408.072331] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 408.072332] CR2: 000000c0003c6000 CR3: 000000010c106005 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 408.072336] PKRU: 55555554 [ 408.072337] Call Trace: [ 408.072338] <TASK> [ 408.072340] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 408.072344] ? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10 [ 408.072347] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x40 [ 408.072349] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x15d/0x830 [ 408.072353] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ 408.072357] ? mutex_lock+0x84/0xe0 [ 408.072359] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 408.072361] ceph_con_workfn+0x27e/0x10e0 [ 408.072364] ? metric_delayed_work+0x311/0x2c50 [ 408.072367] process_one_work+0x611/0xe20 [ 408.072371] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ 408.072373] worker_thread+0x7e3/0x1580 [ 408.072375] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 408.072378] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 408.072381] kthread+0x381/0x7a0 [ 408.072383] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 408.072385] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 408.072387] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ 408.072389] ? recalc_sigpending+0x160/0x220 [ 408.072392] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x50 [ 408.072394] ? calculate_sigpending+0x78/0xb0 [ 408.072395] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 408.072397] ret_from_fork+0x2b6/0x380 [ 408.072400] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 408.072402] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 408.072406] </TASK> [ 408.072407] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 408.072418] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2025-68298 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Avoid btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf() NULL deref In btusb_mtk_setup(), we set `btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` to: usb_ifnum_to_if(data->udev, MTK_ISO_IFNUM) That function can return NULL in some cases. Even when it returns NULL, though, we still go on to call btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf(). As of commit e9087e828827 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Add locks for usb_driver_claim_interface()"), calling btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf() when `btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` is NULL will cause a crash because we'll end up passing a bad pointer to device_lock(). Prior to that commit we'd pass the NULL pointer directly to usb_driver_claim_interface() which would detect it and return an error, which was handled. Resolve the crash in btusb_mtk_claim_iso_intf() by adding a NULL check at the start of the function. This makes the code handle a NULL `btmtk_data->isopkt_intf` the same way it did before the problematic commit (just with a slight change to the error message printed). | ||||
| CVE-2025-68306 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Fix kernel crash when releasing mtk iso interface When performing reset tests and encountering abnormal card drop issues that lead to a kernel crash, it is necessary to perform a null check before releasing resources to avoid attempting to release a null pointer. <4>[ 29.158070] Hardware name: Google Quigon sku196612/196613 board (DT) <4>[ 29.158076] Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth] <4>[ 29.158154] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) <4>[ 29.158162] pc : klist_remove+0x90/0x158 <4>[ 29.158174] lr : klist_remove+0x88/0x158 <4>[ 29.158180] sp : ffffffc0846b3c00 <4>[ 29.158185] pmr_save: 000000e0 <4>[ 29.158188] x29: ffffffc0846b3c30 x28: ffffff80cd31f880 x27: ffffff80c1bdc058 <4>[ 29.158199] x26: dead000000000100 x25: ffffffdbdc624ea3 x24: ffffff80c1bdc4c0 <4>[ 29.158209] x23: ffffffdbdc62a3e6 x22: ffffff80c6c07000 x21: ffffffdbdc829290 <4>[ 29.158219] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff80cd3e0648 x18: 000000031ec97781 <4>[ 29.158229] x17: ffffff80c1bdc4a8 x16: ffffffdc10576548 x15: ffffff80c1180428 <4>[ 29.158238] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 000000000000e380 x12: 0000000000000018 <4>[ 29.158248] x11: ffffff80c2a7fd10 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000100000000 <4>[ 29.158257] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 2d7223ff6364626d <4>[ 29.158266] x5 : 0000008000000000 x4 : 0000000000000020 x3 : 2e7325006465636e <4>[ 29.158275] x2 : ffffffdc11afeff8 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffffdc11be4d0c <4>[ 29.158285] Call trace: <4>[ 29.158290] klist_remove+0x90/0x158 <4>[ 29.158298] device_release_driver_internal+0x20c/0x268 <4>[ 29.158308] device_release_driver+0x1c/0x30 <4>[ 29.158316] usb_driver_release_interface+0x70/0x88 <4>[ 29.158325] btusb_mtk_release_iso_intf+0x68/0xd8 [btusb (HASH:e8b6 5)] <4>[ 29.158347] btusb_mtk_reset+0x5c/0x480 [btusb (HASH:e8b6 5)] <4>[ 29.158361] hci_cmd_sync_work+0x10c/0x188 [bluetooth (HASH:a4fa 6)] <4>[ 29.158430] process_scheduled_works+0x258/0x4e8 <4>[ 29.158441] worker_thread+0x300/0x428 <4>[ 29.158448] kthread+0x108/0x1d0 <4>[ 29.158455] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 <0>[ 29.158467] Code: 91343000 940139d1 f9400268 927ff914 (f9401297) <4>[ 29.158474] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- <0>[ 29.167129] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception <2>[ 29.167144] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs <4>[ 29.167158] ------------[ cut here ]------------ | ||||
| CVE-2025-68308 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: kvaser_usb: leaf: Fix potential infinite loop in command parsers The `kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd()` and `kvaser_usb_leaf_read_bulk_callback` functions contain logic to zero-length commands. These commands are used to align data to the USB endpoint's wMaxPacketSize boundary. The driver attempts to skip these placeholders by aligning the buffer position `pos` to the next packet boundary using `round_up()` function. However, if zero-length command is found exactly on a packet boundary (i.e., `pos` is a multiple of wMaxPacketSize, including 0), `round_up` function will return the unchanged value of `pos`. This prevents `pos` to be increased, causing an infinite loop in the parsing logic. This patch fixes this in the function by using `pos + 1` instead. This ensures that even if `pos` is on a boundary, the calculation is based on `pos + 1`, forcing `round_up()` to always return the next aligned boundary. | ||||