| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Alosuite that affects the delivery note functionality. Insufficient sanitization and encoding of the specified fields allow JavaScript to be stored, which executes in other users’ browsers when they view the affected records. Exploitation requires authenticated access to the affected functionality. The code can alter the displayed content and perform actions within the context of the victim’s session. The list of features, parameters, and endpoints is as follows:
CVE-2026-108055: Nombre in ‘/Inmuebles/Create’; |
| A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Alosuite that affects the delivery note functionality. Insufficient sanitization and encoding of the specified fields allow JavaScript to be stored, which executes in other users’ browsers when they view the affected records. Exploitation requires authenticated access to the affected functionality. The code can alter the displayed content and perform actions within the context of the victim’s session. The list of features, parameters, and endpoints is as follows:
CVE-2026-108054: Nombre in ‘/Familias/Edit/{id}’; |
| A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Alosuite that affects the delivery note functionality. Insufficient sanitization and encoding of the specified fields allow JavaScript to be stored, which executes in other users’ browsers when they view the affected records. Exploitation requires authenticated access to the affected functionality. The code can alter the displayed content and perform actions within the context of the victim’s session. The list of features, parameters, and endpoints is as follows:
CVE-2026-108053: Nombre in ‘/CuentasCorrientes/Create’; |
| A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Alosuite that affects the delivery note functionality. Insufficient sanitization and encoding of the specified fields allow JavaScript to be stored, which executes in other users’ browsers when they view the affected records. Exploitation requires authenticated access to the affected functionality. The code can alter the displayed content and perform actions within the context of the victim’s session. The list of features, parameters, and endpoints is as follows:
CVE-2026-108052: Codigo in ‘/CategoriasFicheros/Edit/{id}’; |
| A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Alosuite that affects the delivery note functionality. Insufficient sanitization and encoding of the specified fields allow JavaScript to be stored, which executes in other users’ browsers when they view the affected records. Exploitation requires authenticated access to the affected functionality. The code can alter the displayed content and perform actions within the context of the victim’s session. The list of features, parameters, and endpoints is as follows:
CVE-2026-108051: Nombre in ‘/Articulos/Create’; |
| A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Alosuite that affects the delivery note functionality. Insufficient sanitization and encoding of the specified fields allow JavaScript to be stored, which executes in other users’ browsers when they view the affected records. Exploitation requires authenticated access to the affected functionality. The code can alter the displayed content and perform actions within the context of the victim’s session. The list of features, parameters, and endpoints is as follows:
CVE-2026-108050: ReferenceOtherParty in ‘/Documents/DeliveryNotes/Edit/{id}’; |
| Clickjacking vulnerability in the Alosuite web application. The affected login interface can be embedded in a web page controlled by an attacker because it does not implement adequate user interface protection mechanisms, such as the X-Frame-Options header or an appropriate Content-Security-Policy (frame-ancestors) directive. By tricking a victim into interacting with a malicious web page, an attacker can trigger unwanted actions within the Alosuite application embedded in the frame, which could compromise the integrity of user interactions and facilitate further attacks against authenticated users. |
| Vulnerability due to a lack of request limits in Alosuite’s password recovery functionality. The ‘/Account/resetPwd’ endpoint does not enforce adequate restrictions on the number or frequency of password reset requests sent for a single account. As a result, a remote attacker can repeatedly call the endpoint to generate an unlimited number of password reset emails addressed to a user, causing an email flood and enabling abuse of the password recovery mechanism. The absence of request limits or other controls against automation can harm legitimate users, consume application and email infrastructure resources, and facilitate automated attacks against the password recovery service. |
| Inadequate authorization vulnerability in Alosuite’s user invitation functionality. The ‘/Requests/userInvitation’ endpoint does not properly validate the assignment of privileges on the server, allowing an attacker to manipulate the invitation parameters during the request process. By intercepting and modifying a legitimate invitation request, an unauthenticated attacker can assign administrative privileges to a newly invited user without the appropriate authorization checks. A successful exploit results in unauthorized privilege escalation, granting full administrative access to the affected application. |
| Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in Alosuite due to insufficient authorization checks when processing object identifiers. By modifying the identifier provided to the ‘/Companies/Edit/{id}’ endpoint, an attacker can access information associated with other companies or users without the appropriate authorization. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote attackers to enumerate valid object identifiers and retrieve information that should be restricted to authorized users, resulting in the unauthorized disclosure of application data. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow exists in Kamailio v6.1.3 and v6.1.4 in the ims_registrar_pcscf module. When processing a crafted application/reginfo+xml NOTIFY message, process_contact() copies an attacker-controlled port value from the alias parameter into a fixed 5-byte stack buffer without validating its length. An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger stack corruption and terminate the P-CSCF process, resulting in denial of service. |
| Improper input validation in the WireGuard VPN function may allow a remote attacker with high privileges to inject system commands and execute them with root privileges. |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain Management Center, Feature Release versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.8, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.80, LTS2025 release versions 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.40, LTS2026 release versions 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.20, contain a Missing Authorization vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to unauthorized system operation on managed systems. |
| An out-of-bounds read in the NTS-KE client response parser (nts_client_process_response_core) in NTPsec before 1.2.4 allows a malicious NTS-KE server to read the client's stack memory, including pointers that defeat ASLR, which the client then sends in cleartext as NTS cookies, via an NTS-KE record whose declared length exceeds the data received. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: don't flood a cancelling task with task_work
io_ring_exit_work() asks each task which has used the ring to remove its
tctx node, by task_work, and repeats that until the list is empty.
io_tctx_exit_cb() doesn't touch the node while the task is in
io_uring_cancel_generic(), which removes all the nodes at its end. So the
work item queues the callback again as soon as it has completed, for
nothing.
That is more than a waste of time. task_work_run() only returns when it
finds the list empty. If the rings are released from inside the
cancellation, because requests of other rings held the last references to
their files, up to 64 work items keep sending callbacks to the one task
which is running them. It never finds the list empty, never gets back to
the cancellation, the nodes stay, and so it goes on: a task with 60 pairs
of rings which poll each other ran 280000 callbacks in 5 seconds, 20
seconds after exit_group(). It ends when all the senders happen to be late
at the same time. Until then the task keeps a CPU and the work items busy.
An exiting task can't be killed meanwhile. execve() cancels the requests in
the same way, so a live task can get stuck there as well, for minutes. If
it takes more than five, the work items run into the
WARN_ON_ONCE(time_after(jiffies, timeout)) of io_ring_exit_work(). No
privilege is needed for any of this.
If the callback has met a task in cancellation, wait a little before it is
sent again. Nobody has to wake the work item up for that: either the node
is gone by then, or it is the turn of the next round. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: correct reservation fence slots for userq per-vm BOs eviction
It fixes both the move overflow and the eviction fence add for
evicting these per-vm BOs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Hold trace_types_lock when resetting last boot data from readers
update_last_data_if_empty() is called from tracing_open() with O_TRUNC,
tracing_read_pipe() and tracing_buffers_read() without trace_types_lock.
Two readers can both pass the LAST_BOOT test and free module_delta
twice, and a module notifier can update module_delta while it is being
freed.
Take trace_types_lock in those paths and keep the callers that already
hold it on an unlocked variant. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/timeout: don't lose a cancel as io-wq arms a timeout
An IORING_OP_TIMEOUT run by io-wq, because of IOSQE_ASYNC, has the same
problem as poll, futex and waitid. io_wq_submit_work() looks at
IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL once, before it issues the request. A cancel in between
flags the work, gets -EALREADY, and searches ->timeout_list in vain,
while the worker then adds the request and starts the timer:
io-wq worker io_try_cancel()
io_wq_submit_work()
IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL isn't set
io_async_cancel_one()
sets IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL
= -EALREADY
io_timeout_cancel() = -ENOENT
io_timeout()
adds the request to ->timeout_list
hrtimer_start()
= IOU_ISSUE_SKIP_COMPLETE
Nobody looks at the flag again, and the timeout runs its course. At ring
exit, io_uring_try_cancel_requests() cancels io-wq work and then kills
the timeouts the same way, so an exiting task can get stuck for the full
duration of such a timeout.
Look at the flag under ->timeout_lock, which the search takes as well,
and fail the request if it is set. If the search came first, the flag is
visible. If it comes later, it finds the request on the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/poll: avoid retry wakeup loss when dropping ownership
If a wakeup sets IO_POLL_RETRY_FLAG between the owning task consuming
the existing instance of IO_POLL_RETRY_FLAG and the loop check
of io_poll_check_events(), then we stall on processing the request
until an unrelated wakeup comes along.
Using atomic_cmpxchg instead of atomic_sub_return to guarantee both the
count v and poll_refs are 0 and no wake-ups are missed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/net: don't retry recv on uncommitted buffers
Commit 41b70df5b38b ("io_uring/net: commit partial buffers on retry")
commits ring provided buffers when a receive is going to be retried after
a partial transfer, so that another request using the same buffer group
can't be handed the memory the first one keeps receiving into. It commits
the number of bytes received so far. That does the job for a single
buffer which is consumed as a whole, but the request hangs on to all it
has mapped:
- For a buffer ring with IOU_PBUF_RING_INC only these bytes are consumed.
The rest of the buffer stays at the head of the ring.
- For a bundle only the buffers which hold these bytes are consumed, the
others that were peeked stay in the ring.
In both cases the next receive with that buffer group gets memory that
the retried request is still going to write to, and whoever comes last
overwrites the data of the other. What the retry fills isn't committed at
all, as the buffer list isn't known any more at that point. So the kernel
hands it out again later on, while the CQE tells the application that it
was used, and for an incremental buffer that it is done with.
The remainder can't be committed in advance: if the request ends up
receiving less, there is no way to tell the application that more was
consumed than the CQE accounts for. Complete the request with what it has
got instead of retrying it. MSG_WAITALL is no longer honoured for
receives into incremental buffers or multi buffer bundles, they can
return a short count, with the request marked as failed like for other
short MSG_WAITALL transfers. |
