| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-multipath: fix underflow in ANA log bounds checks
The number of ANA groups advertised through Identify Controller sizes the
ANA log buffer. The ANA log header and group descriptors independently
supply the number of groups and namespace IDs to parse.
Both bounds checks subtract an untrusted object size from ana_log_size
before comparing the current offset. If the object is larger than the
buffer, the size_t subtraction underflows and lets the parser read beyond
ana_log_buf.
Check the current offset before the first subtraction and compare each
object size with the remaining buffer instead. This rejects inconsistent
ANA data before dereferencing a truncated group descriptor or walking an
oversized namespace ID array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Guard conntrack opts error writes
The conntrack lookup and allocation kfuncs take an opts pointer
together with an opts__sz argument. The verifier checks only the memory
range described by opts__sz, but the wrappers unconditionally write
opts->error whenever the internal lookup or allocation helper returns an
error.
For an invalid size smaller than the end of opts->error, that write can
land outside the verifier-checked range. Keep returning NULL for invalid
arguments, but only report the error through opts->error when the
supplied size includes the field.
This preserves error reporting for the supported 12-byte and 16-byte
layouts, and for other invalid sizes that still include opts->error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: reject short AUTH_RECEIVE buffers
nvmet_execute_auth_receive() trusts the AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length
after checking only that it is nonzero and matches the transfer length.
In the SUCCESS1 and FAILURE1/default states, that lets a remote NVMe-oF
initiator reach the fixed-size DH-HMAC-CHAP response builders with a
kmalloc() buffer shorter than the response, so nvmet_auth_success1() and
nvmet_auth_failure1() write past the allocation; both only WARN_ON the
short length and then format the message anyway.
Impact: A remote NVMe-oF initiator with access to an auth-enabled target
can trigger a 16-byte heap out-of-bounds write via a one-byte
AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length.
Compute the minimum response length for the current DH-HMAC-CHAP step in
nvmet_auth_receive_data_len() and report a zero data length when the
host-supplied allocation length is shorter, so the existing zero-length
check in nvmet_execute_auth_receive() rejects the command before any
builder runs. The SUCCESS1 minimum is sizeof(struct
nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) plus the HMAC hash length, because the
response hash is written into the rval[] flexible-array tail, so the
minimum is state dependent rather than a flat sizeof. CHALLENGE keeps its
existing variable-length guard in nvmet_auth_challenge().
This is reachable only when in-band DH-HMAC-CHAP authentication is
configured on the target. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: update channel list in reg notifier instead reg worker
Currently when ath11k gets a new channel list, it will be processed
according to the following steps:
1. update new channel list to cfg80211 and queue reg_work.
2. cfg80211 handles new channel list during reg_work.
3. update cfg80211's handled channel list to firmware by
ath11k_reg_update_chan_list().
But ath11k will immediately execute step 3 after reg_work is just
queued. Since step 2 is asynchronous, cfg80211 may not have completed
handling the new channel list, which may leading to an out-of-bounds
write error:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ath11k_reg_update_chan_list
Call Trace:
ath11k_reg_update_chan_list+0xbfe/0xfe0 [ath11k]
kfree+0x109/0x3a0
ath11k_regd_update+0x1cf/0x350 [ath11k]
ath11k_regd_update_work+0x14/0x20 [ath11k]
process_one_work+0xe35/0x14c0
Should ensure step 2 is completely done before executing step 3. Thus
Wen raised patch[1]. When flag NL80211_REGDOM_SET_BY_DRIVER is set,
cfg80211 will notify ath11k after step 2 is done.
So enable the flag NL80211_REGDOM_SET_BY_DRIVER then cfg80211 will
notify ath11k after step 2 is done. At this time, there will be no
KASAN bug during the execution of the step 3.
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-wireless/patch/20230201065313.27203-1-quic_wgong@quicinc.com/
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Clamp implicit feedback packet count to URB capacity
data_ep_set_params() allocates each data URB for exactly u->packets
isochronous frames, so urb->iso_frame_desc[] has u->packets slots and
ctx->packets is the driver's only record of that limit. For an implicit
feedback sink, snd_usb_queue_pending_output_urbs() overwrites it with the
sync source's packet count, which is calculated independently from the
capture endpoint's parameters. When that count is larger,
prepare_playback_urb() and prepare_silent_urb() can write
iso_frame_desc[] past the allocation; their existing bounds limit payload
bytes, not the descriptor index.
The reproducer uses a high-speed UAC2 device declaring bInterval 1 for
implicit feedback capture (8 packets) and bInterval 4 for playback
(1 packet). On the first capture completion after the stream starts, it
accesses seven descriptors spanning 112 bytes beyond the one-packet URB:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in prepare_playback_urb (sound/usb/pcm.c:1560)
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88801e696ad0 by task vhci_rx/178
prepare_playback_urb (sound/usb/pcm.c:1560)
prepare_outbound_urb (sound/usb/endpoint.c:340)
snd_usb_queue_pending_output_urbs (sound/usb/endpoint.c:501)
snd_complete_urb (sound/usb/endpoint.c:1834)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)
usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741)
vhci_rx_loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:107)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e696a00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 208-byte region [ffff88801e696a00, ffff88801e696ad0)
Record the allocated packet count per endpoint and clamp both the adopted
count and the packet-size copy to it. Fold the Format Type II delimiter
into urb_packs before the allocation loop so the recorded limit matches
every URB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix out-of-bounds write in l2cap_ecred_connect
l2cap_chan_connect() tries to ensure there are no more than
L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_SCID_MAX pending ECRED channels, so they fit in the
same L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ that l2cap_ecred_connect() constructs.
However, the check only counts deferred channels. If 6 L2CAP sockets
are connected at the same time in order DDDDND (D=deferred,
N=non-deferred), the last can bump the total to max+1. It results to
one __le16 written out of bounds of the scid array, and an invalid
ECRED_CONN_REQ being sent.
Fix by leaving room for the non-deferred pending ECRED channels in the
counting in l2cap_chan_connect(), so the limit can't be exceeded.
Move counting under same critical section where the channel is added.
Although race conditions involving this appear unreachable, it's easier
to see.
Also add WARN_ON_ONCE check in l2cap_ecred_defer_connect() to make this
less brittle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix TX descriptor availability check for TSO traffic
stmmac_tso_xmit() estimates the number of free TX descriptors required by
a TSO skb as:
(skb->len - proto_hdr_len) / TSO_MAX_BUFF_SIZE + 1
which assumes the payload is split into TSO_MAX_BUFF_SIZE chunks. This
underestimates the descriptors actually consumed by stmmac_tso_allocator(),
since each fragment is mapped individually and so it needs at least one
descriptor regardless of its size. Moreover, one descriptor is used for
the L2/L3/L4 headers and, when the MSS changes, one more is consumed for
the MSS context descriptor.
For a highly fragmented TSO skb the check can therefore pass even when the
ring has too few free slots. stmmac_tso_allocator() then writes past the
available descriptors, overwriting descriptors still owned by the DMA
engine, corrupting the TX ring.
Add stmmac_tso_get_num_desc() to compute the exact number of descriptors
needed for the header, the linear payload and each fragment, plus the MSS
context descriptor when required, and use it in the availability check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
"cpu", "CPU", "stacktrace" and "STACKTRACE" are generic fields, defined
with an offset and a size of zero so that the filter code can match them
by name. parse_field() maps them onto their common_* equivalents for
backward compatibility, but unlike the common_* names it hands the
placeholder back to the caller instead of NULL.
create_hist_field() takes a non-NULL field as a promise that the record
carries a stacktrace and picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK, so the __data_loc
word is read from offset 0, that is from common_type, and its low 16
bits are followed as an offset into the record. What is found there
becomes the length of an unbounded memcpy. Pick an event whose id is
small enough that the offset stays inside its own record and the length
is a kernel text address:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 'hist:keys=STACKTRACE' > events/ftrace/print/trigger
# echo hello > trace_marker
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x23/0x60
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30
event_hist_trigger+0x2e7/0x12c0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Leave the field NULL, which is what the comment above the branch says
the code does and what common_stacktrace already does. FILTER_CPU and
FILTER_COMM are left alone, their create_hist_field() branches never
look at the field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Validate full buffer range in ivpu_to_cpu_addr
Add a size parameter to ivpu_to_cpu_addr() and validate that the
whole [vpu_addr, vpu_addr + size) range stays within the BO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Bound VP index against VP_CTRL IOCB bitmap size
The VP control IOCB selects its target virtual port by setting one bit
in vp_idx_map, a fixed 16-byte (128-bit) array in both
vp_ctrl_entry_24xx and vp_ctrl_entry_24xx_ext. qla25xx_ctrlvp_iocb()
computes map = (vp_index - 1) / 8 and writes vce->vp_idx_map[map]
without checking that map stays within the array.
max_npiv_vports is taken from firmware and only sanitized to a
MIN_MULTI_ID_FABRIC-aligned boundary, so it can legitimately be 191 or
255, and qla24xx_control_vp() only rejects vp_index >= max_npiv_vports.
A vp_index above 128 therefore yields map >= 16 and an out-of-bounds
write of up to 16 bytes past vp_idx_map, corrupting the trailing IOCB
fields (or the adjacent request-ring slot on the 64-byte layout).
Reject a vp_index that cannot be represented in the IOCB bitmap in
qla24xx_control_vp(), and add a defensive ARRAY_SIZE() guard in
qla25xx_ctrlvp_iocb() before the write. Adapters that report the usual
63 or 127 NPIV vports are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: reject duplicate wiphy cipher suite entries
Duplicate entries in wiphy->cipher_suites do not describe any
additional capability, but cfg80211 currently accepts them and leaves
individual consumers to deal with them.
One such consumer is the WEXT compatibility code, which appends a WEP
key length for each WEP cipher entry it sees. Repeated WEP entries can
therefore overflow the fixed iw_range::encoding_size array returned by
SIOCGIWRANGE.
Reject duplicate cipher suite entries in wiphy_register() instead.
This keeps the cipher suite invariant in one place and makes malformed
wiphy descriptions fail early with -EINVAL, rather than relying on a
single cfg80211 user to handle duplicates correctly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
genirq/proc: Size interrupt directory names for 10-digit interrupt numbers
/proc/irq/<n>/ directory names are built in `char name[10]` buffers
with `sprintf(name, "%u", irq)`.
Ten-digit IRQ numbers already need 11 bytes including the trailing NUL, and
current sparse-IRQ configurations allow interrupt numbers in that range.
Size the temporary name buffer for the current decimal form and switch
to bounded formatting when creating or removing the proc entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: validate and share PSP fw_pri_buf copies via psp_copy_fw
Change psp_copy_fw from void to int: return -ENODEV when drm_dev_enter
fails, and -EINVAL when the image size is zero or larger than the
1 MiB PSP private buffer.
Replace open-coded memset/memcpy into fw_pri_buf with psp_copy_fw. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Bound GPIO I2C table entry count from VBIOS
Reject undersized tables and cap the derived entry count
to AMDGPU_MAX_I2C_BUS so we do not overrun adev->i2c_bus[]
or walk an absurd number of entries on corrupt size fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: validate RX band_idx before dereferencing phys[]
band_idx comes from a 2-bit descriptor field (0-3) and was used directly
to index dev->mt76.phys[] (size __MT_MAX_BAND == 3) and dereference the
result. A corrupt or reserved descriptor value could index out of bounds
or hit a NULL phy on parts with fewer bands. Reject invalid band indices,
mirroring mt7996_rx_get_wcid(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: Fix memory corruption by not reinjecting CK machine checks
Channel-subsystem damage machine checks are for the host channel
subsystem. The guest channel subsystem is emulated in the userspace VMM.
There is no point in forwarding such machine checks into the guest.
This also simplifies the machine check reinjection and avoids kfree of a
stack variable as reported by sashiko. There might be still machine
checks that have the ck bit set with another bit (like instruction
damage), mask out the CK bit in s390_backup_mcck_info(), like the CP and
ED bits already are. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to migrate all curseg types during free_segment_range
In free_segment_range(), the curseg evacuation loop only iterates up to
NR_CURSEG_PERSIST_TYPE (0..5), missing non-persistent in-memory curseg
types such as CURSEG_COLD_DATA_PINNED and CURSEG_ALL_DATA_ATGC.
Even though these in-memory curseg types are not saved in the on-disk
checkpoint header, they still occupy active physical segments at runtime.
If an active in-memory curseg happens to be allocated within the segment
range being truncated during filesystem shrink, failing to evacuate it
will cause subsequent writes to the curseg attempting out-of-bounds I/O
on the truncated storage range.
Fix this by expanding the curseg evacuation loop upper bound to
NR_CURSEG_TYPE to ensure all active curseg types are safely migrated
out of the target range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix out-of-bounds write when null terminating a label vec
aa_vec_unique() null terminates at vec[n - dups] when VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE
is passed. If the components are all distinct no duplicates are dropped,
dups is 0 and the terminator goes to vec[n], so the caller has to provide
room for n + 1 entries.
aa_label_strn_parse() sets up its vector with vec_setup(profile, vec, len,
gfp) and then calls aa_vec_unique(vec, len, VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE), but
vec_setup() does not reserve the terminator entry. Up to LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES
it uses the local array of LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES pointers, above that it
allocates exactly len pointers. The terminator therefore lands one entry
past the end of the local array when len is LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES, and one
entry past the end of the allocation when len is larger.
len comes from the number of "//&" separated components in the label name
and label_count_strn_entries() does not bound it. An unprivileged task
reaches the parse by writing to /proc/self/attr/apparmor/current or through
lsm_set_self_attr(2), both of which go through do_setattr(), and the name
is parsed before the change_profile permission is checked.
The query_label() path behind the securityfs .access file, which is
mode 0666, performs no permission check at all. Every component has to
resolve to a loaded profile, so a system with policy loaded is required.
The other two VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE users work on a label vec that
aa_label_alloc() has already sized with "+ 1 for null terminator entry on
vec". Reserve the same entry in vec_setup() and DEFINE_VEC(). Passing
len + 1 from the caller instead would move len == LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES out of
the local array and into kzalloc(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus) Fix type confusion in notification logic
Sashiko reports:
At the start of the loop in pmbus_notify(), the code unconditionally casts
every attribute to a struct sensor_device_attribute:
drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c:pmbus_notify() {
for (i = 0; i < data->num_attributes; i++) {
struct device_attribute *da = to_dev_attr(data->group.attrs[i]);
struct sensor_device_attribute *attr = to_sensor_dev_attr(da);
int index = attr->index;
...
}
However, data->group.attrs can contain other types like struct
pmbus_samples_reg or struct pmbus_sensor, which only embed a base
struct device_attribute.
If da is a struct pmbus_samples_reg, dev_attr is the last member. Casting
it to struct sensor_device_attribute and reading the index field appears
to access memory past the end of the allocation, which might trigger a
slab-out-of-bounds read.
Additionally, if da is a struct pmbus_sensor, casting it causes the index
field to overlap with the page, phase, and reg fields. Could this produce
a garbage mask on little-endian systems that spuriously matches the target
reg, page, and flags during an alert?
Fix the problem by using struct sensor_device_attr in struct pmbus_sensor
and struct pmbus_label. Since those attributes never trigger a
notification, set the value of attr->index to -1 for them. Use this value
to distinguish from boolean attributes which _can_ trigger a notification
and use the index field to encode mask, page, and register values. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: rx: restore msg_iter before TLS 1.3 optimistic retry
tls_decrypt_sg() advances msg->msg_iter when it maps user pages for
the optimistic TLS 1.3 zero-copy path. If the decrypted record turns
out not to be unpadded application data, tls_decrypt_sw() retries into
a kernel skb, but leaves the iterator advanced.
The subsequent copy from the skb then writes decrypted bytes again at
a later point in the caller iovecs while recvmsg() reports only the
post-retry length. A TLS peer can trigger this after the receiver
enables TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD.
Revert the iterator by the number of bytes consumed by the optimistic
mapping before retrying without zero-copy.
Add a selftest which sends a TLS 1.3 control record with
TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD enabled and verifies that recvmsg() does not
overwrite later iovecs beyond the returned length. |
