| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Register callbacks after creating the ngd
When the remoteproc starts in parallel with the NGD driver being probed,
or the remoteproc is already up when the PDR lookup is being registered,
or in the theoretical event that we get an interrupt from the hardware,
these callbacks will operate on uninitialized data. This result in
issues to boot the affected boards.
One such example can be seen in the following fault, where
qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify() schedules work on the NULL ngd_up_work.
[ 21.858578] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 21.858745] WARNING: kernel/workqueue.c:2338 at __queue_work+0x5e0/0x790, CPU#2: kworker/2:2/116
...
[ 21.859251] Call trace:
[ 21.859255] __queue_work+0x5e0/0x790 (P)
[ 21.859265] queue_work_on+0x6c/0xf0
[ 21.859273] qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify+0x110/0x150 [slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl]
[ 21.859304] qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_notify+0x24/0x40 [slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl]
[ 21.859318] notifier_call_chain+0xa4/0x230
[ 21.859329] srcu_notifier_call_chain+0x64/0xb8
[ 21.859338] ssr_notify_start+0x40/0x78 [qcom_common]
[ 21.859355] rproc_start+0x130/0x230
[ 21.859367] rproc_boot+0x3d4/0x518
...
Move the enablement of interrupts, and the registration of SSR and PDR
until after the NGD device has been registered.
This could be further refined by moving initialization to the control
driver probe and by removing the platform driver model from the picture. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
writeback: Fix use after free in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn()
inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() has a loop like:
wb_get(new_wb);
while (1) {
list = llist_del_all(&new_wb->switch_wbs_ctxs);
/* Nothing to do? */
if (!list)
break;
... process the items ...
}
Now adding of items to the list looks like:
wb_queue_isw()
if (llist_add(&isw->list, &wb->switch_wbs_ctxs))
queue_work(isw_wq, &wb->switch_work);
Because inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() loops when processing isw items, it
can happen that wb->switch_work is pending while wb->switch_wbs_ctxs is
empty. This is a problem because in that case wb can get freed (no isw
items -> no wb reference) while the work is still pending causing
use-after-free issues.
We cannot just fix this by cancelling work when freeing wb because that
could still trigger problematic 0 -> 1 transitions on wb refcount due to
wb_get() in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn(). It could be all handled with
more careful code but that seems unnecessarily complex so let's avoid
that until it is proven that the looping actually brings practical
benefit. Just remove the loop from inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() instead.
That way when wb_queue_isw() queues work, we are guaranteed we have
added the first item to wb->switch_wbs_ctxs and nobody is going to
remove it (and drop the wb reference it holds) until the queued work
runs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix mechToken leak when SPNEGO decode fails after token alloc
The kernel ASN.1 BER decoder calls action callbacks incrementally as it
walks the input. When ksmbd_decode_negTokenInit() reaches the mechToken
[2] OCTET STRING element, ksmbd_neg_token_alloc() allocates
conn->mechToken immediately via kmemdup_nul(). If a later element in
the same blob is malformed, then the decoder will return nonzero after
the allocation is already live. This could happen if mechListMIC [3]
overrunse the enclosing SEQUENCE.
decode_negotiation_token() then sets conn->use_spnego = false because
both the negTokenInit and negTokenTarg grammars failed. The cleanup at
the bottom of smb2_sess_setup() is gated on use_spnego:
if (conn->use_spnego && conn->mechToken) {
kfree(conn->mechToken);
conn->mechToken = NULL;
}
so the kfree is skipped, causing the mechToken to never be freed.
This codepath is reachable pre-authentication, so untrusted clients can
cause slow memory leaks on a server without even being properly
authenticated.
Fix this up by not checking check for use_spnego, as it's not required,
so the memory will always be properly freed. At the same time, always
free the memory in ksmbd_conn_free() incase some other failure path
forgot to free it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: prevent potential infinite loop in bond_header_parse()
bond_header_parse() can loop if a stack of two bonding devices is setup,
because skb->dev always points to the hierarchy top.
Add new "const struct net_device *dev" parameter to
(struct header_ops)->parse() method to make sure the recursion
is bounded, and that the final leaf parse method is called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Always pass in an error pointer to __sev_platform_shutdown_locked()
When
9770b428b1a2 ("crypto: ccp - Move dev_info/err messages for SEV/SNP init and shutdown")
moved the error messages dumping so that they don't need to be issued by
the callers, it missed the case where __sev_firmware_shutdown() calls
__sev_platform_shutdown_locked() with a NULL argument which leads to
a NULL ptr deref on the shutdown path, during suspend to disk:
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 983 Comm: hib.sh Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-i, BIOS 2.5 09/08/2022
RIP: 0010:__sev_platform_shutdown_locked.cold+0x0/0x21 [ccp]
That rIP is:
00000000000006fd <__sev_platform_shutdown_locked.cold>:
6fd: 8b 13 mov (%rbx),%edx
6ff: 48 8b 7d 00 mov 0x0(%rbp),%rdi
703: 89 c1 mov %eax,%ecx
Code: 74 05 31 ff 41 89 3f 49 8b 3e 89 ea 48 c7 c6 a0 8e 54 a0 41 bf 92 ff ff ff e8 e5 2e 09 e1 c6 05 2a d4 38 00 01 e9 26 af ff ff <8b> 13 48 8b 7d 00 89 c1 48 c7 c6 18 90 54 a0 89 44 24 04 e8 c1 2e
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005467d00 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 00000000ffffff92 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
and %rbx is nice and clean.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sev_firmware_shutdown.isra.0
sev_dev_destroy
psp_dev_destroy
sp_destroy
pci_device_shutdown
device_shutdown
kernel_power_off
hibernate.cold
state_store
kernfs_fop_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
Pass in a pointer to the function-local error var in the caller.
With that addressed, suspending the ccp shows the error properly at
least:
ccp 0000:47:00.1: sev command 0x2 timed out, disabling PSP
ccp 0000:47:00.1: SEV: failed to SHUTDOWN error 0x0, rc -110
SEV-SNP: Leaking PFN range 0x146800-0x146a00
SEV-SNP: PFN 0x146800 unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x146800 - 0x146a00]
...
ccp 0000:47:00.1: SEV-SNP firmware shutdown failed, rc -16, error 0x0
ACPI: PM: Preparing to enter system sleep state S5
kvm: exiting hardware virtualization
reboot: Power down
Btw, this driver is crying to be cleaned up to pass in a proper I/O
struct which can be used to store information between the different
functions, otherwise stuff like that will happen in the future again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Fix dereferencing uninitialized error pointer
Fix below smatch warnings:
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1312 __sev_platform_init_locked()
error: we previously assumed 'error' could be null |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: Delay put pmc->idev in mld_del_delrec()
pmc->idev is still used in ip6_mc_clear_src(), so as mld_clear_delrec()
does, the reference should be put after ip6_mc_clear_src() return. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: remove one synchronize_net() barrier in ipv6_mc_down()
As discussed in the past (commit 2d3916f31891 ("ipv6: fix skb drops
in igmp6_event_query() and igmp6_event_report()")) I think the
synchronize_net() call in ipv6_mc_down() is not needed.
Under load, synchronize_net() can last between 200 usec and 5 ms.
KASAN seems to agree as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: mhi: host: Add alignment check for event ring read pointer
Though we do check the event ring read pointer by "is_valid_ring_ptr"
to make sure it is in the buffer range, but there is another risk the
pointer may be not aligned. Since we are expecting event ring elements
are 128 bits(struct mhi_ring_element) aligned, an unaligned read pointer
could lead to multiple issues like DoS or ring buffer memory corruption.
So add a alignment check for event ring read pointer. |
| IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.1 contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key, which it uses for its own inbound authentication, outbound communication to external components, or encryption of internal data. |
| IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 allows an authenticated attacker to create a malicious flow pointing to an attacker-controlled URL that returns a specially crafted Content-Disposition header (e.g., filename="../../../target/path" ), enabling arbitrary file write operations with attacker-controlled content to any path accessible by the Langflow process. |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. |
| A use-after-free vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel's netfilter subsystem in net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c.
Mishandled error handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE makes it possible to use a dangling pointer in the same transaction causing a use-after-free vulnerability. This flaw allows a local attacker with user access to cause a privilege escalation issue.
We recommend upgrading past commit 1240eb93f0616b21c675416516ff3d74798fdc97 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix NULL pointer bug in svm_range_set_attr
The process_info could be NULL if user doesn't call kfd_ioctl_acquire_vm
before calling kfd_ioctl_svm.
(cherry picked from commit 83a26c812e0529eb040d31a76f73e33e637243d4) |
| A possible unauthorized memory access flaw was found in the Linux kernel's cpu_entry_area mapping of X86 CPU data to memory, where a user may guess the location of exception stacks or other important data. Based on the previous CVE-2023-0597, the 'Randomize per-cpu entry area' feature was implemented in /arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c, which works through the init_cea_offsets() function when KASLR is enabled. However, despite this feature, there is still a risk of per-cpu entry area leaks. This issue could allow a local user to gain access to some important data with memory in an expected location and potentially escalate their privileges on the system. |
| IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 Langflow 1.9.0 could allow server-side request forgery (SSRF) due to insecure default configuration and incomplete enforcement of the SSRF protection mechanism. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: composite: fix integer underflow in WebUSB GET_URL handling
The WebUSB GET_URL handler in composite_setup() narrows
landing_page_length to fit the host-supplied wLength using
landing_page_length = w_length
- WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH + landing_page_offset;
If wLength is smaller than WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH the
unsigned subtraction wraps, and the subsequent
memcpy(url_descriptor->URL,
cdev->landing_page + landing_page_offset,
landing_page_length - landing_page_offset);
ends up copying close to UINT_MAX bytes from cdev->landing_page into
cdev->req->buf. KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds in composite_setup
on the kmalloc-2k gadget_info allocation, and FORTIFY_SOURCE traps the
memcpy as a 4294967293-byte field-spanning write into
url_descriptor->URL (size 252).
A USB host can reach this from a single SETUP packet against any
gadget that has webusb/use=1 and a landingPage configured.
Handle the small-wLength case before the math: when the host requested
fewer bytes than the URL descriptor header, only the header is
meaningful and no URL bytes need to be copied. Setting
landing_page_length to landing_page_offset makes the existing memcpy a
no-op and leaves the descriptor returned to the host unchanged for all
larger wLength values. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: qcom_geni: fix kfifo underflow when flush precedes DMA completion IRQ
When uart_flush_buffer() runs before the DMA completion IRQ is delivered,
the following race can occur (all steps serialized by uart_port_lock):
1. DMA starts: tx_remaining = N, kfifo contains N bytes
2. DMA completes in hardware; IRQ is pending but not yet delivered
3. uart_flush_buffer() acquires the port lock and calls kfifo_reset(),
making kfifo_len() = 0 while tx_remaining remains N
4. uart_flush_buffer() releases the port lock
5. DMA IRQ fires; handle_tx_dma() acquires the port lock and calls
uart_xmit_advance(uport, tx_remaining) on an empty kfifo
uart_xmit_advance() increments kfifo->out by tx_remaining. Since
kfifo_reset() already set both in and out to 0, out wraps past in,
causing kfifo_len() to return UART_XMIT_SIZE - tx_remaining. The next
start_tx_dma() call then submits a DMA transfer of stale buffer data.
Fix this by snapshotting kfifo_len() at the start of handle_tx_dma()
and skipping uart_xmit_advance() when fifo_len < tx_remaining, which
indicates the kfifo was reset by a preceding flush. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: serialize DMABUF cancel against request completion
ffs_epfile_dmabuf_io_complete() calls usb_ep_free_request() on the
completed request but leaves priv->req, the back-pointer that
ffs_dmabuf_transfer() set on submission, pointing at the freed
memory. A later FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_DETACH ioctl or
ffs_epfile_release() on the close path still sees priv->req
non-NULL under ffs->eps_lock:
if (priv->ep && priv->req)
usb_ep_dequeue(priv->ep, priv->req);
so usb_ep_dequeue() is called on a freed usb_request.
On dummy_hcd the dequeue path only walks a live queue and
pointer-compares, so the freed pointer reads without faulting and
KASAN requires an explicit check at the FunctionFS call site to
surface the use-after-free. On SG-capable in-tree UDCs the
dequeue path dereferences the supplied request immediately:
* chipidea's ep_dequeue() does
container_of(req, struct ci_hw_req, req) and reads
hwreq->req.status before acquiring its own lock.
* cdnsp's cdnsp_gadget_ep_dequeue() reads request->status first.
The narrower option of clearing priv->req via cmpxchg() in the
completion does not close the race: the completion runs without
eps_lock, so a cancel path holding eps_lock can still observe
priv->req non-NULL, race a concurrent completion that clears and
frees, and pass the freed pointer to usb_ep_dequeue(). A slightly
longer fix that moves the free into the cleanup work is needed.
Same class of lifetime race as the recent usbip-vudc timer fix [1].
Take eps_lock in the sole place that mutates priv->req from the
callback direction by moving usb_ep_free_request() out of the
completion into ffs_dmabuf_cleanup(), the existing work handler
scheduled by ffs_dmabuf_signal_done() on
ffs->io_completion_wq. Clear priv->req there under eps_lock
before freeing, and only clear if priv->req still names our
request (a subsequent ffs_dmabuf_transfer() on the same
attachment may have queued a new one).
This keeps the existing dummy_hcd sync-dequeue invariant: the
completion callback is still invoked by the UDC without
eps_lock held (dummy_hcd drops its own lock before calling the
callback), and the callback now takes no f_fs lock at all.
Serialization against the cancel path happens in cleanup, which
runs from the workqueue with no f_fs lock held on entry.
The priv ref count protects the containing ffs_dmabuf_priv:
ffs_dmabuf_transfer() takes a ref via ffs_dmabuf_get(), cleanup
drops it via ffs_dmabuf_put(), so priv stays live for the
cleanup even after the cancel path's list_del + ffs_dmabuf_put.
The ffs_dmabuf_transfer() error path no longer frees usb_req
inline: fence->req and fence->ep are set before usb_ep_queue(),
so ffs_dmabuf_cleanup() (scheduled by the error-path
ffs_dmabuf_signal_done()) owns the free regardless of whether
the queue succeeded.
Reproduced under KASAN on both detach and close paths against
dummy_hcd with an observability hook
(kasan_check_byte(priv->req) immediately before usb_ep_dequeue)
at the two FunctionFS cancel sites to surface the stale-pointer
access; the hook is not part of this patch. The KASAN
allocator / free stacks in the captured splats identify the
same request: alloc in dummy_alloc_request, free in
dummy_timer, fault reached from ffs_epfile_release (close) and
from the FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_DETACH ioctl (detach). With the
patch applied, both paths are silent under the same hook.
The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in
real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon
(adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not
reachable from unprivileged userspace or from a USB host on the
cable. FunctionFS mounts default to GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, but the
filesystem supports uid=, gid=, and fmode= delegation to a
non-root gadget daemon, so on real deployments the attacker may
be a less-privileged service rather than root. |
| IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 allows authenticated users to escalate privileges to superuser by directly manipulating the database, execute arbitrary system commands, and achieve full system compromise with Langflow service permissions. |
