| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mailbox: imx: Add a channel shutdown field
sashiko complained about possible teardown problem. The scenario
CPU 0 CPU 1
imx_mu_isr() imx_mu_shutdown()
imx_mu_xcr_rmw(priv, IMX_MU_RCR, 0, IMX_MU_xCR_RIEn(priv->dcfg->type, cp->idx));
imx_mu_specific_rx()
imx_mu_xcr_rmw(priv, IMX_MU_RCR, IMX_MU_xCR_RIEn(priv->dcfg->type, 0), 0);
free_irq()
The RX event remains enabled because in this short window the RX event
was disabled in ->shutdown() while the interrupt was active and then
enabled again by the ISR while ->shutdown waited in free_irq().
This race requires timing and if happens can be problematic on shared
handlers if the "removed" channel triggers an interrupt. In this case
the irq-core will shutdown the interrupt with the "nobody cared"
message.
Introduce imx_mu_con_priv::shutdown to signal that the channel is
shutting down. This flag is set with the lock held (by
imx_mu_xcr_clr_shut()). The unmask side uses imx_mu_xcr_set_act() which
only enables the event if the channel has not been shutdown and
serialises on the same lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: Avoid releasing netdev before teardown completes
The patch cited in the Fixes tag below changed the teardown code for
OVS ports to no longer unconditionally take the RTNL. After this change,
the netdev_destroy() callback can proceed immediately to the call_rcu()
invocation if the IFF_OVS_DATAPATH flag is already cleared on the
netdev.
The ovs_netdev_detach_dev() function clears the flag before completing
the unregistration, and if it gets preempted after clearing the flag (as
can happen on an -rt kernel), netdev_destroy() can complete and the
device can be freed before the unregistration completes. This leads to a
splat like:
[ 998.393867] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xff00000001000239: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 998.393877] CPU: 42 UID: 0 PID: 55177 Comm: ip Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.1.1.el10_2.x86_64+rt #1 PREEMPT_RT
[ 998.393886] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/0JMK61, BIOS 2.24.0 03/27/2025
[ 998.393889] RIP: 0010:dev_set_promiscuity+0x8d/0xa0
[ 998.393901] Code: 00 00 75 d8 48 8b 53 08 48 83 ba b0 02 00 00 00 75 ca 48 83 c4 08 5b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 83 bf 48 09 00 00 00 75 91 48 8b 47 08 <48> 83 b8 b0 02 00 00 00 74 97 eb 81 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 90 90 90
[ 998.393906] RSP: 0018:ffffce5864a5f6a0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 998.393912] RAX: ff00000000ffff89 RBX: ffff894d0adf5a05 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 998.393917] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff894d0adf5a05
[ 998.393921] RBP: ffff894d19252000 R08: ffff894d19252000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 998.393924] R10: ffff894d19252000 R11: ffff894d192521b8 R12: 0000000000000006
[ 998.393927] R13: ffffce5864a5f738 R14: 00000000ffffffe2 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 998.393931] FS: 00007fad61971800(0000) GS:ffff894cc0140000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 998.393936] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 998.393940] CR2: 000055df0a2a6e40 CR3: 000000011c7fe003 CR4: 00000000007726f0
[ 998.393944] PKRU: 55555554
[ 998.393946] Call Trace:
[ 998.393949] <TASK>
[ 998.393952] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
[ 998.393961] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
[ 998.393975] ? dp_device_event+0x41/0x80 [openvswitch]
[ 998.394009] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0x12
[ 998.394016] ? die_addr+0x3c/0x60
[ 998.394027] ? exc_general_protection+0x16d/0x390
[ 998.394042] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
[ 998.394058] ? dev_set_promiscuity+0x8d/0xa0
[ 998.394066] ? ovs_netdev_detach_dev+0x3a/0x80 [openvswitch]
[ 998.394092] dp_device_event+0x41/0x80 [openvswitch]
[ 998.394102] notifier_call_chain+0x5a/0xd0
[ 998.394106] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x51b/0xa60
[ 998.394110] rtnl_dellink+0x169/0x3e0
[ 998.394121] ? rt_mutex_slowlock.constprop.0+0x95/0xd0
[ 998.394125] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x142/0x3f0
[ 998.394128] ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x69/0xf0
[ 998.394130] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[ 998.394132] netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0x100
[ 998.394138] netlink_unicast+0x292/0x3f0
[ 998.394141] netlink_sendmsg+0x21b/0x470
[ 998.394145] ____sys_sendmsg+0x39d/0x3d0
[ 998.394149] ___sys_sendmsg+0x9a/0xe0
[ 998.394156] __sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xd0
[ 998.394160] do_syscall_64+0x7f/0x170
[ 998.394162] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 998.394165] RIP: 0033:0x7fad61bf4724
[ 998.394188] Code: 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bb 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d c5 e9 0c 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89
[ 998.394189] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7e2f7cb8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[ 998.394191] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fad61bf4724
[ 998.394193] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd7e2f7d20 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 998.394194] RBP: 00007ffd7e2f7d90 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 000000000000003f
[ 998.394195] R10: 000055df11558010 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffd7e2
---truncated--- |
| XSA-501 was about issues with v1 -> v2 and v2 -> v1 changes racing certain
other grant table operations. Sadly a v2 -> v1 -> v2 change has yet
another effect which wasn't accounted for: During the first change, status
pages would be freed. During the second change they would be allocated
again. Hence across the full pair of change the addresses of the status
pages may change, rendering stale previously calculated pointers into the
status array. |
| Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From 2.2.7 until 2.2.11, ServiceSentinel.worker in service/singleton/servicesentinel.go checked an owned service under servicesLock and later dereferenced pointer-valued serviceStatusToday and serviceCurrentStatusData entries under serviceResponseDataStoreLock without revalidating that ServiceSentinel.Delete had not removed them. A RoleMember could concurrently report TCP or ICMP results through the member's own agent and delete the same owned service, causing a nil pointer dereference. Because the gRPC server had no recovery interceptor, the worker panic terminated the whole dashboard process and disrupted every tenant's web interface, REST API, and agent connections. The issue affects availability only and does not disclose or modify data. This issue is fixed in versions 2.2.11 and 2.3.0. |
| A race condition was addressed with additional validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27, macOS Sequoia 15.8, macOS Tahoe 26.7. A malicious application may be able to bypass Privacy preferences. |
| Replaying GSS-TSIG signed UDP messages can result in memory corruption in "`named`". An attacker who can capture a previously signed UDP message can replay it while the negotiated TSIG key is still valid. By also sending crafted queries to a zone the attacker controls, the attacker may potentially achieve remote code execution.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.29, 9.21.0 through 9.21.26, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.29-S1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix a TOCTOU race in SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START
The SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START handler checks timer_pending() before calling
timer_reduce(). The timer can expire and detach between these operations,
causing timer_reduce() to rearm the timer without taking the association
reference required for the newly armed timer.
The timer callback later unconditionally drops its association reference,
which can leave the association reference count unbalanced and result in
use-after-free during association teardown.
Use the return value of timer_reduce() to determine whether the timer was
actually armed. Take the association reference only when timer_reduce()
successfully starts a new timer, closing the race between checking the
timer state and rearming it.
This issue was reported by Nico Yip (@_cyeaa_) working with TrendAI Zero
Day Initiative. |
| A data race in the RDMA transport of Apache bRPC (versions < 1.18.0) allows a remote client to crash the server process (denial of service) when RDMA is enabled at build time and runtime.
Root Cause:
When a bRPC server negotiates RDMA with a client, the handshake completes on the TCP fd, but the server kept parsing that fd afterwards as if it were still an RPC channel. The TCP-fd input stream and the RDMA QP input stream (driven by CQ events) shared the same Socket::_read_buf, preferred_index and parsing_context without synchronization. In addition, CQ event processing could start while the handshake parsing was still in progress, and the handshake ACK phase could consume bytes belonging to the next protocol. A remote, unauthenticated client that has completed the RDMA handshake can send data on the TCP fd at the same time RDMA messages are being processed, corrupting the shared input buffer and parser state and crashing the server process (CWE-362, availability impact).
Affected Scenarios:
Use a bRPC server with RDMA support enabled (built with BRPC_WITH_RDMA and serving rdma:// / SOCKET_MODE_RDMA sockets) and accept connections from untrusted clients. Deployments without RDMA are not affected.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3505 |
| Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') vulnerability in WPdevelop Booking Calendar booking allows Leveraging Race Conditions.This issue affects Booking Calendar: from n/a through 11.8.4. |
| Traefik 2.11.x before 2.11.58 and 3.x before 3.7.14 contains a race condition in NTLM and Kerberos (Negotiate) backend authentication, where the per-connection sticky round tripper slot is read and written without synchronization. Remote attackers can send concurrent HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 requests over one connection to orphan backend connections, break connection-bound authentication, or crash Traefik. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Remove __counted_by from struct amdxdna_cmd_chain
struct amdxdna_cmd_chain contains a flexible array annotated with
__counted_by(command_count). Since the structure is stored in shared
AMDXDNA_BO_SHARE memory, userspace can modify command_count concurrently.
If command_count is changed to zero, the bounds check generated from
__counted_by may fail and trigger a kernel panic.
Remove __counted_by to avoid relying on the userspace-controlled
command_count for the flexible array bounds check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: fix racy access to FDP placement id array
nvme_query_fdp_info() is called per-path and therefore prone to races.
It populates head->nr_plids/head->plids for fdp registration.
But nothing protects that pair from concurrent access - two paths scanning
the same namespace can race to populate it.
Avoid the race by moving this initialization work to nvme_alloc_ns_head()
which is called once per shared namespace. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Virtualization-Based Security (VBS) Enclave allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix race between perf_event_exit_task() and perf_pending_task()
A race condition exists between perf_event_exit_task() and
perf_pending_task() during begin_new_exec().
During begin_new_exec(), perf_event_exit_task() may be called, and the
PF_EXITING flag is not set on task. So perf_sigtrap() continues to execute
and triggers WARN_ON_ONCE(event->ctx->task != current).
Since both task exit and exec paths can call perf_event_exit_task() which
sets ctx->task to TASK_TOMBSTONE, fix this by explicitly checking if
event->ctx->task equals TASK_TOMBSTONE and dropping the redundant
PF_EXITING check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: lock sk in iso_connect_ind
Accessing iso_pi(sk)->conn requires lock_sock, which is not taken in the
"ev3" part of iso_connect_ind. It may also be NULL if socket has
transitioned away from the LISTEN/CONNECT states before locking.
Fix by adding lock/release. Recheck hcon is valid after lock acquire
where needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid1,raid10: fix error-path detection with md_cloned_bio()
Detect the error path using md_cloned_bio() instead of relying
on r1_bio in raid1 or r10_bio->read_slot in raid10, which may be
NULL or -1 after splitting and resubmitting a failed bio.
As a result, the error path may not be recognized and memory
allocations can incorrectly use GFP_NOIO instead of
(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH), which can lead to a deadlock under
memory pressure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit
The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are
reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto
hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent
drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that
had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace
is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on
the handshake_req allocation.
Pass the source and destination in the documented order
(list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending
list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through
handshake_complete().
Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After
the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers,
threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests.
A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's
TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not
taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls
remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list).
__remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the
scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same
call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an
entry hits LIST_POISON instead.
Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under
hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The
drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing
test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates
between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use
list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list
does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry.
The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false,
but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on
HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference.
Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees
the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list.
Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list,
and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request. |
| Improper privilege management in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
