| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/io-wq: don't hide a link from cancellations
A task that exits cancels its tracked requests and waits until they are
gone. io_uring_cancel_generic() looks everywhere a request can be, and
goes to sleep if it found nothing to cancel. It is woken up each time
one of the requests of the task is completed by task work or freed.
When io-wq is done with a request that has a link, there is a time in which
the next request of the link can't be found:
io_worker_handle_work()
io_assign_current_work(worker, NULL)
io_wq_free_work(work)
io_req_find_next() // takes the link off the request
io_free_req() // task work for the task
io_assign_current_work(worker, linked)
io_run_task_work()
cond_resched()
worker->cur_work = linked
It is not pending, it is not the current work of a worker, and it is not
yet on the list that it is about to be parked on. If the pass that the
exiting task makes because of io_free_req() falls into that time, it finds
nothing and the task goes to sleep. The worker then runs the link, which
IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT doesn't prevent for bounded work. If that parks the request
nothing is completed or freed, and nobody wakes up the task. If it is the
process that exits it can't be killed any more either.
NOP, IOSQE_ASYNC | IOSQE_IO_LINK
FUTEX_WAIT, FUTEX2_PRIVATE
exit of the thread, or of the process, up to 63us later
With four of these per round 5 to 8 of 10,000 rounds hang (4 CPUs, KVM):
io_uring_cancel_generic
do_exit
Commit f8b632e89a10 ("io_uring: tighten task exit cancellations") is about
the same gap, and makes the task look again for whatever happens before
io_free_req().
Free the request once the link is the current work of the worker, or
pending. Whoever is woken up by that can find the link, until it is parked
where cancellations look as well. To do so split io_wq_free_work() in two. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm cache: fix issue with background work locking
dm cache used a rw_semaphore for background_work_lock. Write locks on
rw_semaphores have strict owner semantics, but there was no guarantee
that the process that locked background_work_lock was the same process
that unlocked it. This can be easily seen using a kernel compiled with
CONFIG_DEBUG_RWSEMS. Given a dm cache device <cache>, run: 'dmsetup
suspend <cache> && dmsetup resume <cache>'. This will trigger a kernel
warning:
DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE))
triggered by cache_resume(). To fix this, switch from a rw_semaphore to
a spinlock and a wait queue. dm cache already has a wait queue and
associated counter, migration_wait and nr_allocated_migrations, that was
getting woken up when background work was getting completed, but wasn't
actually used by anything. This is replaced by the background_work queue
and counter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/hyperv: Avoid using per-cpu output page in hv_apicid_to_vp_index()
hv_apicid_to_vp_index() currently uses the per-cpu hypercall input
and output pages. This function is called when running in VTL2 and
when running in an SEV-SNP CoCo VM with no paravisor. In the former
case, the output page is allocated, but in the latter case it is
not, so the hypervisor stores the output VP index in memory that has
not been allocated by the guest.
Fix this by using the input page for both input and output. The
hypercall has very small input and output, so sharing the same
page for both is straightforward. An alternative fix is to
allocate the per-cpu output page when running in an SEV-SNP CoCo
guest, but this uses significantly more memory, particularly
with larger vCPUs counts. |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle HRMS (India) product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Indian Payroll). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle HRMS (India). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle HRMS (India) accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N). |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle HRMS (Republic of Korea) product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Korean Payroll). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle HRMS (Republic of Korea). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle HRMS (Republic of Korea) accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N). |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle HRMS (US) product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: US Payroll Year End). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle HRMS (US). Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in Oracle HRMS (US), attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle HRMS (US) accessible data as well as unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle HRMS (US) accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 5.4 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N). |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle HRMS (India) product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Indian Payroll). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with logon to the infrastructure where Oracle HRMS (India) executes to compromise Oracle HRMS (India). While the vulnerability is in Oracle HRMS (India), attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle HRMS (India) accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N). |
| NVIDIA nvJPEG contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause a divide-by-zero. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io-wq: order the exit bit against worker creation task work
io_wq_exit_workers() cancels task work for queued worker creation with
task_work_cancel_match(). That has a plain load of task->task_works.
io_queue_worker_create() adds the new entry and tests IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT to
cancel it if the workqueue is already on its way out.
That must be ordered. task_work_add() has a full barrier via cmpxchg().
But io_wq_exit_start() sets the bit with set_bit() which doesn't have
any memory ordering.
So afaict, on weakly ordered architectures the exiting task may load
task_works before the store of the bit is visible. The other side tests
the bit before the store is visible as well. So the entry remains queued
with worker_refs and the exiting task waits on worker_done indefinitely.
If the task still has rings then io_uring_del_tctx_node() provides the
barrier via test_and_set_bit() in io_wq_set_exit_on_idle(). When it
has closed all rings though that barrier is gone.
Add the barrier after the set_bit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pid_namespace: prevent TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting the reaper
Since commit 7fea700e04bd ("zap_pid_ns_processes: clear
TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL along with TIF_SIGPENDING") zap_pid_ns_processes()
clears TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL before every kernel_wait4() call. Otherwise
kernel_wait4() doesn't sleep and returns -ERESTARTSYS if
signal_pending() is true and the reaper busy-waits.
But clearing TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL doesn't fix it. It can get raised again.
For example, klp_send_signals() sets it raw against any task that hasn't
transitioned yet. And it keeps sending it until the livepatch finishes.
The sleep loop waiting for pid_allocated to drop has the same problem
and it doesn't even clear anything. So a schedule() in
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE returns immediately.
Use a no_notify_signal guard. signal_pending() will ignore
TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and the pid namespace reaper sleeps until a child
exits or free_pid() wakes it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable
When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits
until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the
namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids
allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every
suspend attempt fails:
Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0):
Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which
returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer's fake signal; the loop then clears
TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop
sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING
there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt
and the task spins until the wait ends.
Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the
freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE |
TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does.
This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the
threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does
not reap those killed during the dump. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/mpscq: disable preemption while pushing
A push makes the node the new tail, and then links it to its predecessor.
In between the queue isn't empty, but mpscq_pop() can't get at the node.
The consumers deal with that by trying again, with a cond_resched() in
the loop to give a preempted producer the chance to finish.
cond_resched() doesn't do that if the consumer has a higher priority than
the producer and both have to use the same CPU:
producer (SCHED_OTHER) consumer (SCHED_FIFO), same CPU
io_req_local_work_add()
mpscq_push()
prev = xchg(&q->tail, node)
<preempted> io_cqring_wait()
__io_run_local_work()
again:
cond_resched() // nothing to do
mpscq_pop() // NULL
// work pending, no events yet
goto again
The producer can be any task that is able to queue task_work for the
ring: an io-wq worker, or somebody who sends a message with
IORING_OP_MSG_RING. The consumer spins, holding ->uring_lock, until the
scheduler takes pity on the fair class, which takes about a second with
the default settings of the fair server, and forever without it. The
loops in tctx_task_work_run() and io_cancel_local_task_work() have the
same problem.
Don't allow preemption between the two steps. That bounds the time the
window is open on the CPU of the producer by what interrupts take, and a
consumer that waits for that is on another CPU. The cost is a
preempt_disable()/preempt_enable() pair per push. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc/tegra: pmc: Fix uninitialised clock rate
For legacy 32-bit Tegra devices, the warning in the
tegra_pmc_enter_suspend_mode() function is being triggered because the
early_pmc->rate variable is never configured and hence, always 0. This
issue started occurring after updating the PMC driver to create the PMC
context dynamically which causes the 'rate' to be set in the new dynamic
context, but missed updating the rate in the early PMC context.
Fix this by initialising the early_pmc->rate variable for 32-bit Tegra
devices when the rate for the PMC context is initialised.
[treding@nvidia.com: move assignment to existing #ifdef block] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: correct reservation fence slots for userq per-vm BOs eviction
It fixes both the move overflow and the eviction fence add for
evicting these per-vm BOs. |
| Instatic before 0.0.21 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in its AI/MCP content read tools that allows low-privileged authenticated users with ai.chat and content.edit.own capabilities to access data rows belonging to other users by calling content_get_document and content_list_documents without the object-level authorization checks enforced by the normal HTTP API. Attackers can use the MCP interface to retrieve private or unpublished draft content and enumerate rows from the posts system table, resulting in cross-user data disclosure. |
| The actions linked in the emails of the extension (e.g. to confirm a registration or the deletion of an account) do not reject requests with a missing or invalid hash. Instead, the frontend user given in the request is used. Unauthenticated attackers can therefore perform these actions for arbitrary active frontend users. This allows them to retrieve the email address or username of all frontend users and to delete arbitrary frontend user accounts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KEYS: Fix key_reject_and_link() race with keyring restriction
The restrict_link check in key_reject_and_link() is done before taking
the keyring semaphore, racing with a concurrent keyring_restrict()
that installs the restriction while holding the semaphore in write
mode.
Move the check to after __key_link_lock(), so it is done under the
semaphore, matching the pattern used in __key_create_or_update(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/cancel: rearm local work wake up before sleep
io_uring_try_cancel_requests() sets ->cq_wait_nr to 1 so that the next
io_req_local_work_add() wakes the cancelling task. The add that takes the
count to zero is the only one that wakes, later ones see a count <= 0 and
return. io_uring_cancel_generic() however only becomes
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE much later, so the one wake up can be spent on a
running task. That is fine as long as the entry of that add is still
queued, as the io_local_work_pending() check then skips the sleep. It is
not if the add was delayed after queueing its entry:
CPU0 (submitter in exec or exit) CPU1 (io_req_local_work_add)
mpscq_push(req A)
io_uring_try_cancel_requests()
io_run_local_work() // runs req A
io_uring_try_cancel_requests()
atomic_set(&ctx->cq_wait_nr, 1)
atomic_read(&ctx->cq_wait_nr) == 1
count taken, wake_up_state()
// task is running, no-op
prepare_to_wait(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE)
io_local_work_pending() == false
schedule()
mpscq_push(req B)
cq_wait_nr <= 0, return
Only the sleeping task can run req B, so it is stuck in execve() until a
signal happens to wake it. An exiting task doesn't even get that.
Arm the count again once the task state is set and before the work list
is checked, for the rings whose local work this task is the one to run. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: Fix potential UAF in reqsk_timer_handler().
When TCP socket migration fails at inet_ehash_insert() in
reqsk_timer_handler(), we jump to the no_ownership: label
and free the new reqsk immediately with __reqsk_free().
Thus, we must stop the new reqsk's timer before jumping to the
label, but the timer might be missed since the cited commit,
resulting in UAF.
As we are in the original reqsk's timer context, we can safely
call timer_delete_sync() for the new reqsk.
Let's pass false to __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop() to stop
the new reqsk's timer. |
| The BuddyBoss App plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.1 via the send_feedback function. This is due to insufficient file type validation that relies solely on the client-supplied Content-Type header without server-side content inspection or extension validation. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to upload files that may be executable, which makes remote code execution possible. While uploaded files are deleted after email transmission, a race condition exists during SMTP execution that allows access to the file, and files persist indefinitely when wp_mail() fails. |
